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Chapter 1
Introduction
Communication has been essential to the development of mankind and has paved the way
to incredible human achievements. In the 1800s, communication over long distances, or
telecommunication, became feasible due to the invention of the telegraph and then the
telephone. These devices enabled the transmission of information through conducting
materials such as copper, by encoding data on electrical signals. The transmission distance
and amount of information that can be sent this way is limited because the lines are lossy and
are potentially noisy due to interference [1, pp. 1–4].
Optical fibres can be used instead, carrying data as light. These are flexible cables with a
dielectric core for light to travel through, surrounded by a dielectric cladding material with a
smaller refractive index. Light is guided down this waveguide, allowing signals to be sent
and received with a small loss, due only to scattering and absorption in the fibre [1, pp. 4–8].
They became especially useful in the 1980s due to the development of semiconductor lasers
and light emitting diodes. These can efficiently produce light in the low-loss regions of glass,
allowing for a standard transmission loss rate of 0.2 dB/km at a light wavelength of 1550 nm.
Today, there is a vast network of optical fibre links all around the world, enabling high-speed
and high-bandwidth telecommunication.
1.1 Cryptography
It is often important for two parties, Alice and Bob, to communicate in private. An eavesdrop-
per, Eve, can listen to signals sent through a copper cable by placing electrical coils around
the cable and observing the leakage. She can also eavesdrop signals sent through optical
fibres, where she simply bends the fibre to the extent that light leaks out [2]. This allows
her to extract some of the signal, giving her information about the message, whilst leaving
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her intrusion unnoticed. This is worrying, because without countermeasures it would mean
that highly sensitive information is not private. Patient data transmitted between hospitals,
sensitive military details or government communications could be read by malevolent parties.
Cryptography is the study of how to ensure data transmitted through a communication
channel remains confidential. It also explores authentication, which means the receiver can
be certain that a message is sent from the correct person; integrity, which ensures the message
is not tampered with; and non-repudiation, which prevents a party from pretending that they
did not send a message [3, pp. 2–4]. Confidentiality is enabled by encryption, where an
algorithm is used to obscure the contents of a message from any nefarious third parties. If
these third parties learn how to decipher messages with a certain algorithm, cryptographers
must fix the algorithm or use a new one. This competition has created a cycle of continuous
improvement across centuries.
The importance of the field has led to it drawing sustained interest from monarchies,
governments, companies and individuals. It is thought to have been conceived over 4000
years ago, where a secret form of hieroglyphics was stored inside the Great Pyramid in
Egypt [4]. From then, it has been famously used by, amongst many other examples, Spartan
informants inside the Persian army, Mary Queen of Scots as part of an assassination plot on
Queen Elizabeth I, and by all militaries in the Second World War [5].
1.1.1 Classical
Encryption
Encryption is where the contents of a message are obscured by applying a key to the message.
Only someone with the decryption key can extract the original message. Rudimental encryp-
tion can be done by hand, however the World Wars saw a rapid development of encryption
algorithms and hardware. This led to advanced hardware being used, such as rotor machines,
to perform cryptography. Nowadays it is completely automated by computers, allowing
nearly everyone to implement some form of encryption on their communications. There
are two main types of cryptographic encryption, public key cryptography and symmetric
encryption [3], as shown in Fig. 1.1.
In public key cryptography, Alice generates a public key from a private key using a
one-way function [6]. This mathematical function should make it impossible to derive the
private key from the public key. In this way, Alice can distribute her public key to Bob, who
can use it to encrypt his message. Alice is the only party with the private key, hence only




Fig. 1.1 Classical cryptography. (a) Identical encryption and decryption keys are used in
symmetric cryptography. (b) Bob uses Alice’s public key to encrypt the message in public key
cryptography. Alice decrypts the message with her private key.
the existence of a perfect one-way function. Indeed, RSA is a current implementation of
public key cryptography and is considered secure [7, 8]. This is based on it being simple to
calculate the product of two large prime numbers, but very difficult to determine the original
prime numbers given the product. Unfortunately, a working quantum computer would allow
RSA encryption to be broken in a realistic timescale by using Shor’s algorithm to efficiently
factorise the product [9]. This is a worrying prospect because a large amount of data that is
currently considered secure could be decrypted in the future.
Symmetric encryption is where Alice and Bob share an identical key for both encryption
and decryption. This can be implemented using a block cipher or a stream cipher [10,
pp. 98–100]. Block ciphers separate the message into sections, for example a 256-bit block,
each of which is encrypted using the same key. Stream ciphers combine the message with
a pseudorandom (or random) key, meaning each bit in the message is treated separately.
Stream ciphers can be made completely secure if the key is perfectly random and is discarded
after use. This is known as a Vernam cipher, or one-time pad. Reusing the key, or using
a non-random key, gives information to Eve. The difficulty with this, however, is in how
to initially distribute the key between the two parties. Public key methods, such as RSA,
can be used once at the beginning of the communication to exchange a private key, then the
message can be encrypted with symmetric encryption. Unfortunately, this does not address
the security concern of public key cryptography. An eavesdropper could hack the initial
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public key exchange and subsequently gain access to the entire message. A workaround is to
use large block sizes that would take a long time to factorise, even with a quantum computer,
however this is not future-proof and assumes that a more efficient algorithm will not be
devised to calculate the private key. One secure method is to use a courier to physically
exchange the key, however this is not always possible and will require more meetings when
the keys are used up.
1.1.2 Quantum
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method that promises to solve the key exchange issue in
symmetric cryptography, sidestepping the potential insecurity of public key cryptography [11,
12]. This technique, proposed in 1984 [13], exploits the principles of quantum mechanics to
detect if anyone is eavesdropping on the signal transmission. This allows the users to share a
perfectly secure one-time pad. To do this, Alice sends a single qubit, usually a photon, to
Bob. A qubit is the quantum version of a classical bit, where, instead of being either 0 or 1, a
particle is in a superposition state of the two values. If Eve attempts to measure the qubit, she
will disturb it in a manner observable to the communicating parties because she collapses
the state into one of the measurement values. If Alice and Bob see that someone is listening
to their key exchange, they can simply choose not to use that key for encryption. QKD is
based on the fundamental laws of physics, ensuring it is future-proof when implemented
correctly. This means that someone eavesdropping on the message transfer will never be able
to decrypt the message, even with infinite computational power.
The security of QKD is commonly and intuitively related to Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle. This states that two conjugate properties of a particle cannot be known together,
for example its position and momentum. If one property is measured with absolute precision,
the other property of the particle becomes non-deterministic. QKD also relies on the no
cloning theorem outlined by Wootters and Zurek (1982) [14], which shows that a quantum
state cannot be perfectly replicated. This prevents an attacker from cloning a photon and
measuring the quantum state of the clone.
Bennett Brassard 1984 (BB84) was the first QKD protocol to be proposed and is perhaps
one of the simplest to help understand the basics of the technology. Let’s assume that Alice
is using polarisation to encode information on single photons of light. She chooses two
potential bases to encode data in, each with orthogonal states within the basis. These states
correspond to the bit value. The rectilinear basis contains horizontally (H) and vertically (V)
polarised photons, and the diagonal basis contains diagonally (D) and anti-diagonally (A)
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polarised photons. She randomly, and without bias, chooses a basis and bit to encode each
photon she transmits to Bob. Bob then randomly selects a basis (H-V or D-A) to measure
each received photon. In an ideal system, when Bob measures in the same basis as Alice’s
encoding basis, he will always measure the same bit that Alice transmitted. If he chooses
the wrong basis, however, the result is non-deterministic because the bases are conjugate.
This means that results obtained using mismatched bases must be removed. To do this, Alice
communicates her encoding basis for all of Bob’s clicks, allowing them to share an identical
key. An example of this is shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Example BB84 protocol key exchange. ↑ corresponds to the rectilinear basis
(H=0, V=1) and ↗ to the diagonal basis (D=0, A=1). The post sifting result is false if the
bases are mismatched.
Alice Basis choice ↗ ↗ ↑ ↗ ↑ ↑ ↗ ↑
Alice Sent Bit 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Bob Basis Choice ↑ ↗ ↗ ↑ ↑ ↗ ↗ ↑
Measured Bit 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
Post Sifting Result x X x x X x X X
Agreed Key - 1 - - 0 - 0 1
The situation changes if an eavesdropper is present. Like Bob, Eve must also choose
a measurement basis, which she will get wrong 50 % of the time (assuming each basis is
equally likely to be sent by Alice). Because the bases are conjugate, this means she has an
overall 25 % chance of measuring a different bit to the one prepared by Alice. She then sends
her measured state in her measurement basis to Bob. Her errors are directly transferred to
Bob, meaning that even when Alice and Bob choose the same basis, they could measure
different bit values due to Eve measuring in the incorrect basis. Alice and Bob compare
a subset of their keys to measure the error rate, allowing them to identify if there is an
eavesdropper in their quantum channel.
Even without an eavesdropper in the channel, Alice and Bob’s keys will not be identical
after removing measurements in mismatched basis. This is due to noise in the system that
can come from a number of sources, for example imperfect state encoding or detector dark
counts. These noise sources are unavoidable, hence algorithms are used to remove errors and
ensure Alice and Bob share identical keys. A maximum tolerated error rate is defined by the
QKD protocol, above which distilling a secure key is impossible.
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1.2 QKD protocols
Since 1984, a number of different QKD protocols have been developed, each with strengths
and weaknesses that make them more or less useful in different circumstances. The more
prominent protocols are briefly discussed in this section, and those implemented in this thesis
are described in more detail in their corresponding chapters. Regardless of the protocol used,
all will result in Alice and Bob sharing an identical random key. Ideally, the protocols should
be simple to implement, provably secure, enable a high bit rate, and work over long distances.
The protocols fit into three main categories [12]:
• Discrete variable (DV) QKD encodes information on separate qubits. These protocols
require single-photon detection techniques.
• Distributed phase reference (DPR) protocols are a variant of DV QKD but have major
theoretical differences so are treated separately. These protocols exploit the coherence
between neighbouring time bins, so the quantum state is a tensor product over a number
of individual photon wavefunctions.
• Continuous variable (CV) QKD encodes information on the phase and amplitude
quadrature of the optical field, and thus can be detected by homodyne or heterodyne
techniques.
There are three different kinds of attack that are interesting when discussing QKD. The
first, and weakest, is an individual attack. Here, Eve entangles quantum probes with each
of the photons separately, stores them in a quantum memory until after Alice and Bob have
communicated classically, then measures each probe individually. The second is a collective
attack. Here, Eve entangles quantum probes with each of the photons separately, stores them
in a quantum memory, then performs a single measurement on the entire system using a
quantum computer. The final, and most general, is known as a coherent attack. In a coherent
attack, Eve entangles a large quantum probe with all of the photons, stores the probe in a
quantum memory, then can perform any measurement that is allowed by quantum physics on
the probe.
1.2.1 Discrete variable
DV protocols encode information on qubits, which relies on phase/intensity or polarisation
encoding of single photons. These protocols were the first to be introduced and are therefore
the best developed class of protocols. Security has been proven for a number of DV protocols
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against the most general form of attack, and very high secure key rates have been achieved
with this security. BB84 is one example of a DV QKD protocol. B92 is a development of
BB84 that uses just two states, instead of the four in BB84 [15]. Each state is in a different
basis, making the protocol easier to experimentally implement, although the security is
weaker, leading to lower secure key rates [16]. Two other interesting DV QKD protocols are
detailed below.
E91
Some protocols are based on photon entanglement [17, 18]. Entanglement is the physical
phenomenon observed when two photons are linked such that an action on one photon
will affect the other photon. The photons are initially in superposition states. When one
photon is measured, the wavefunctions of both particles collapse, yielding results that are
correlated. The use of entanglement to communicate between parties is known as quantum
teleportation [19].
The Ekert 1991 (E91) protocol, named after Artur Ekert, uses entangled photons [20].
This protocol can be carried out with any party (Alice, Bob or Charlie) distributing a pair of
entangled photons to Alice and Bob. The distributing party prepares superposition states, so
has no knowledge of what the measured state will be. Alice and Bob randomly select a basis
to measure each bit in and then sift their bits, as in other protocols.
To test the security of the link, they choose another basis in which to measure the
incoming bits and measure Bell’s inequality. This does not hold for entangled particles, and
thus they can tell if the particles have been interfered with. An advantage of this protocol is
that the random number generation is inherent to the state detection. This removes the need
for high speed quantum random number generators. A downside is that entangled photon
sources are not very bright, limiting the key rates [21].
Measurement device independent QKD
When analysing a QKD system, quantum hackers will look to the most complex part of the
system first, because this is the most likely to contain vulnerabilities. In the case of DV QKD,
the detector has the most complexity, so most attacks target Bob’s detectors [22, 23, 24]. For
example, Eve shines light into Bob’s detectors in the blinding attack so that his single photon
avalanche photodiodes (see Section 1.3.8) are operating in the linear regime, rather than the
Geiger regime. This allows her to control them by sending in her own light pulses. She can
then ensure that Bob’s detectors only click when he measures in the same basis as her, giving
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her full key information and introducing no errors. Measurement-device-independent (MDI)
QKD removes all detector vulnerabilities by introducing another party in the communication,
Charlie [25, 26, 27]. Charlie is the only person with detectors, and learns nothing about the
key shared between Alice and Bob.
The role of Charlie in this protocol is to perform a Bell state measurement on the states
from Alice and Bob. A two-qubit system has four possible Bell states that represent maximal
entanglement between the qubits, and a Bell state measurement projects the system onto
one of these Bell states. If Alice knows the state of her particle and which Bell state Charlie
measures, she can infer what state Bob prepared. Charlie performs this measurement by
interfering the incident photons from the two communicating parties using a beamsplitter
(BS). Identical photons with a random phase incident in the same polarisation state will exit
via the same arm of the BS due to the Hong Ou Mandel effect [28, 29]. Each output of the BS
then has an identical polarising BS with single photon detectors (SPDs) at each output, giving
a total of four detectors. Charlie communicates to Alice and Bob every time he measures a
coincidence between detectors. Alice and Bob are able to infer a shared key because which
detectors click tell them the parity of the combined photons. Each party knows the state they
encoded, thus also knows the state the other party encoded. Charlie would have to know
Alice or Bob’s initial states in order to know each bit, thus he gains no information in this
procedure and can even be completely untrusted.
The author of this thesis has also published an experimental demonstration of how MDI-
QKD can be carried out alongside BB84 [30]. Here, a 45 degree polarisation rotator is placed
on one output of the BS in Charlie, allowing measurements in both polarisation bases. To
carry out BB84 with Charlie, Alice or Bob should transmit a qubit. To carry out MDI-QKD
with one another, Alice and Bob should transmit a qubit. A schematic of this is shown in
Figure 1.2. This could be quite an important development for quantum networks, allowing
all users to be linked securely with N −1 physical links, rather than the N(N −1)/2 physical
links that would be required in an ordinary QKD network. It also means that the average
consumer needs only a transmitter, the cheapest component in QKD systems, relying on an
untrusted company or government to act as Charlie with the expensive detectors.
1.2.2 Distributed phase reference
The first distributed phase reference protocol was proposed in the early 2000s as a method of
simplifying DV QKD experiments [31]. DPR protocols, unlike DV protocols, use a series
of coherent states, meaning the coherence is maintained across all pulses. This makes them
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Fig. 1.2 MDI-QKD with BB84. a) When Alice and Bob are both transmitting, MDI-QKD
can be carried out. b) and c) When Alice or Bob are transmitting, BB84 can be carried out.
simpler to implement because no phase randomisation is required. A break in the coherence
signifies that Eve has made a measurement, allowing Bob to monitor the channel for her
presence. Three different DPR protocols are implemented in this thesis, therefore a detailed
discussion of how each protocol works is left to their respective chapters.
Whilst there are a number of methods to prove the security of DV protocols it is more
difficult to derive a general security proof for DPR protocols because of the way the photon
wavefunction is spread over a number of time bins. Security proofs must instead be studied
for specific attacks [32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. Fortunately, the class of protocols is inherently
secure against photon number splitting attacks, which can severely reduce the secure key
rate of DV protocols. This attack is detailed in Section 1.3.3. The inherent security of DPR
protocols is because an eavesdropper introduces errors in the phase when she tries to do a
measurement on the pulses. This means that the attack is no longer a zero error attack and
Alice can send a higher mean photon number than in conventional BB84, leading to a higher
secure key rate.
Although their resilience to photon number splitting attacks means that DPR protocols
perform better than many DV protocols, it comes at a cost. The security of DPR protocols
has not been proven against coherent attacks, meaning there is currently no absolute lower
bound for the key rate. Whilst actually implementing a coherent attack seems completely
inconceivable, the aim of QKD is often to provide ‘unconditional’ security, rather than just
‘practical’ security. In key rate equations for DPR protocols, Eve’s information is estimated
based on her most effective attack.
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1.2.3 Continuous variable
Cryptography using continuous variables relies on the quadrature components of a light
field, x and p. It is impossible to measure x and p simultaneously because they are non-
commuting [37]. Quadrature amplitude modulation can be achieved by independently
modulating two light beams that have a 90 degree phase shift between them. The combination
of the two creates a single beam with information contained in both the amplitude and phase
quadratures. Measurement is performed using balanced homodyne detection, where the
quantum signal is interfered with a classical reference signal at a beamsplitter and the
difference between the two beamsplitter outputs is measured. The phase of the reference
signal determines which quadrature is measured [38].
The main advantage this technique holds over DV-QKD is that the balanced homodyne
detectors are similar to those in existing telecommunication systems using coherent detec-
tion [39]. This means that developing the kind of detectors required for practical CV-QKD is
more simple than in DV-QKD. Many drawbacks exist for this technique, however. The largest
bottleneck is that CV-QKD does not have any clock periods with no detections, meaning
the received signal requires heavy post processing for error correction [40]. This limits the
secure key rate that can be extracted in a practical scenario. The secure key rate that can be
extracted is also heavily dependent on the excess noise, a parameter that describes all noise
sources beyond the vacuum noise, for example imperfect modulation, phase fluctuations
and detector noise [41, 42, 43]. This prohibits secure keys from being distributed over
long distances. Finally, although there has been continued research in this direction, no
finite-key-size security proof has been derived for CV-QKD against coherent attacks, making
it an important direction of research [43, 44]
CV-QKD has been demonstrated with a secure key rate of 1 Mbps over 25 km of optical
fibre [45]. This is made possible by minimising the excess noise using coarse wavelength
division multiplexing to separate the quantum and classical reference signals, and by using
highly efficient low-noise 1 GHz shot-noise-limited homodyne detectors. This group has
used the same technology to provide the record distance for CV-QKD, over 100 km of optical
fibre, giving a secure key rate just below 1 kbit/s [46].
1.3 Practical QKD
The theoretical analyses of DV and DPR protocols must be translated into real world scenarios,
whilst ensuring security is still maintained. Real QKD systems, for example, have errors
1.3 Practical QKD 11
which must be dealt with. Some features, terms and equations are common to all protocols,
and these are explained in this section. The final secure key rate that can be extracted from
raw detection events at Bob, as well as the requirements on the channel linking Alice and
Bob and the single photon sources that can be used are detailed. Also, methods of phase
modulation, demodulation and randomisation, the practical effect of having a finite key
length to extract error rates from and the current state-of-the-art of the field are outlined.
1.3.1 Key rates
For QKD experiments, the following expression can be written for the detection probability
in each clock period measured by Bob, Pclick:
Pclick = µηchannelηdet +Pdark, (1.1)
where µ is the transmitted photon number, ηchannel is the channel transmissivity, ηdet is the
detection system efficiency, and Pdark is the dark count probability. In optical fibres (with a
loss rate of α dB/km) the channel loss can be related to the channel length in km, L, by
ηchannel = 10−αL/10. (1.2)
The error rate probability, or quantum bit error rate (QBER), is an important parameter
that allows the users to estimate how much information Eve can have. It is defined as the
ratio of incorrectly measured bits to the total number of measured bits [47]. One contribution
to this is the base error rate (QBERbase), which can be caused by imperfect modulation
and optical misalignment. Another contribution is the dark counts, which have a random
probability of making the wrong detector click (Pdark). This dependence causes the QBER to
increase at long distances, limiting the maximum distance over which secure keys can be
generated. These quantities are combined in the following expression [48]:




The factor of two comes from the fact that dark counts have a 50 % probability of causing
the correct detector to click in a system with two detectors. A phenomenon observed in some
SPDs, afterpulsing, as described in Section 1.3.8, can also increase the QBER.
After Bob has detected the qubits transmitted by Alice, their raw keys will be different,
meaning they must do post-processing to extract identical keys and to ensure that Eve has no
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information about the key. The first step is sifting, in which the two parties compare their
transmission and measurement basis, alongside Bob informing Alice when he measured a
‘click’ in his detectors. They then discard any bits in mismatched bases. The next step is
error estimation, where they take a subset of their keys for comparison so they can calculate
the QBER. If this error is too high, they should not use the key. Next is error correction.
Here, Alice and Bob run an algorithm over the public channel to ensure their keys are
identical. A number of methods of doing this exist, with varying efficiencies due to removal
of non-erroneous bits and computational efficiencies (i.e. speed). Finally, the two parties run
a privacy amplification protocol. This reduces Eve’s information about the key, IE , to zero.
This also has a finite efficiency, removing more bits than Eve could have possibly obtained.
The secure key rate per bit, R, can be written as
R = IAB − IE , (1.4)
where IAB is Alice and Bob’s mutual information and IE can be related to Alice (Bob) and
Eve’s mutual information, IAE (IBE):
IE = min(IAE , IBE). (1.5)
IAB concerns the error correction using the QBER estimated from the majority basis. IE
pertains to the privacy amplification using the QBER estimated from the minority basis. This
is the same for all protocols, and thus some permutation of this will be seen in all secure key
rate equations.
1.3.2 Channels
QKD systems require a channel capable of transmitting qubits. An obvious solution is
free-space, although ground-based links are distance and weather limited because a line
of sight between the transmitter and receiver is required [49, 50, 51]. Other drawbacks
include sensitive alignment, noise due to air currents and also the sensitivity of the single
photon detectors to background light. Satellite QKD can enable drastic improvements in the
distances secure keys can be exchanged over because there is negligible photon loss and no
atmospheric turbulence in space [52]. The major drawback to this technique is the extreme
cost and poor availability.
Optical fibres provide a good alternative to free-space QKD. The loss is relatively low,
and no new infrastructure is required because ordinary fibre optic cables can be used. It is
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also very easy to connect transmitters and receivers to fibre optics due to standardisation of
the technology in classical communications.
Two links between Alice and Bob are required for secure QKD [12]. These can be the
same physical channel if techniques like wavelength division multiplexing are used [53, 54].
The first link is an untrusted quantum channel that the qubits are sent through. Untrusted
here means that an eavesdropper can do whatever she wants to the qubits. The second link is
a public authenticated channel. Anybody can read the information in this channel, however
the authentication means that only Alice and Bob can transmit information to each other in
the channel because the messages contain their signatures.
1.3.3 Weak coherent pulses
QKD would be best implemented with a high-rate ideal single photon source. Ideal in this
case means that there is a 100 % probability of emitting just one photon in each clock period.
Also, this should be within the low-loss windows for optical fibres to allow for the best
scaling with distance. Single photons can be produced deterministically in many ways, from
semiconductor quantum dots to nitrogen vacancy centres in diamond. Unfortunately no
ideal source has been developed and, more importantly, the current high-rate single photon
sources are not efficient at the low-loss windows in fibre-optic cables. Indeed, QKD has been
carried out with a quantum dot, however its efficiency makes the secure key rates generated
poor [55].
In practice, weak coherent pulses are found to perform much better than single photon
sources [56, 57, 58, 59]. These are classical light pulses that are attenuated down to contain
a small mean number of photons, µ , and obey a Poissonian number distribution, where the





This technique also has the benefit of being easy to implement with current telecommunica-
tions technology.
An example of two such Poissonian distributions for mean photon numbers of 0.5 and 0.1,
is given in Fig. 1.3. This shows that the most probable outcome for both cases is that Alice
emits no photons. Equally, there is some probability of each emission containing multiple
photons, opening the door to a simple attack by Eve, known as a photon number splitting
attack. In this attack, an all powerful Eve performs a quantum non-demolition measurement
on Alice’s pulses as they travel through the quantum channel, so she can identify the number
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Fig. 1.3 Poissonian number distributions. The probability of emitting n-photon pulses
given the mean prepared photon number ‘µ’.
of photons in each pulse. She extracts one photon from each multi-photon pulse and stores it
in her quantum memory, then blocks all the single photon pulses. Subsequently, she listens
to the classical basis reconciliation between Alice and Bob, allowing her to obtain identical
measurement results to Bob on her stored photons. With this technique, Eve can obtain full
knowledge of the key without introducing any errors. For this reason, it must be assumed that
every time Bob measures a click in his detectors, it could have originated from a multi-photon
pulse transmitted by Alice and hence is considered completely insecure. It is worth noting
that this attack is only possible because no restrictions are placed on Eve. In reality, Alice
and Bob could simply postpone their basis reconciliation to a time beyond the current storage
times of quantum memories.
Alice measures µ , so is able to estimate the maximum amount of information Eve gets
from her photon number splitting attack. Eve’s information can then be reduced to nothing
in the privacy amplification step. Unfortunately this leads to poor performance in QKD
systems. As the channel distance increases, Alice must decrease her photon number to stop
Eve’s attack because there will be added channel loss for Eve to hide her attack. This gives
a quadratic dependence of the secure key rate on channel distance, because the channel
loss is increasing at the same time as Alice’s mean photon number is decreasing. Looking
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again at Fig. 1.3, it is obvious that the probability of emitting multiple photons can be made
vanishingly small by reducing the mean photon number, although this will also lead to a large
probability of simply emitting no photons. When µ=0.5, the ratio of multi-photon states to
single photon states is 1 in 3.36 states, whereas when µ=0.1, the ratio is just 1 in 19.34 states.
This solution is not perfect, however, because it means that no photons are being sent
most of the time, which is inefficient. Decoy states are a useful solution to this, and are
described in detail in Chapter 5.
1.3.4 Phase modulation
Intensity, polarisation and phase are three common light properties that can be controlled
to transmit information. Sending polarisation-encoded signals in a fibre-optic system is
challenging because perturbations in the fibre change the phase and polarisation unpre-
dictably [60]. Continuous alignment is therefore required to ensure Bob’s measurement bases
align with Alice’s preparation bases. For this reason, polarisation coding is predominantly
used in free-space applications, rather than in fibre-optic applications, where the polarisation
changes are much lower [49]. Phase coding, however, uses the relative phase between two
close pulses to encode information. This means that regardless of changes in the fibre, both
pulses experience the same phase change throughout [31].
The simplest method of phase modulation is direct laser modulation. Here, the current
input to the laser diode is varied to change the output phase. Unfortunately, however, this
simultaneously changes the intensity, wavelength and phase of the output light. This change
of wavelength is undesirable in classical communications because it causes intersymbol
interference as different spectral components of the light travel at different velocities in the
fibre due to dispersion. This will reduce the signal-to-noise ratio of such systems. In QKD,
the impact is even more heinous, opening a side channel for Eve to attack. A side channel
is a flaw in the implementation of a cryptographic protocol that leads to an eavesdropper
obtaining information. A simple example is if the transmitter were to audibly click every
time a ‘0’ bit is transmitted. Extended to direct phase modulation, an eavesdropper could
measure the wavelength of each pulse, leaving the phase untouched and thus obtaining
full information of the key without introducing any errors. For these reasons, an external
modulator is most often used for phase modulation. Half-wave voltage (written as Vπ ), is a
metric to compare phase modulators and quantifies the voltage required by the modulator to
achieve a π phase shift [61].
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Phase modulators utilising the electro-optic effect are commonly used in practice. Mate-
rials are used that have a refractive index change in response to an external voltage. Devices
based on Lithium Niobate (LiNbO3) are the most popular in QKD systems because they are
easy to fabricate, have a good bandwidth and operate at achievable voltages [62]. LiNbO3
crystals are highly nonlinear, birefringent and have a large electro-optic coefficient [63].
These properties mean that applying a voltage to the device creates an electric field that
changes the material properties in an identifiable way. Light passing through the device





where λ is the wavelength of light, ∆n(V ) is the change in refractive index caused by an
applied voltage V and L is the interaction length. This allows a voltage to modulate the phase
of light passing through the device. Light makes a single pass through these modulators,
hence L is simply the device length, which can lead to bulky modulators when low driving
voltages are required.
In order to work at high rates, the architecture of electro-optic phase modulators must
be modified in some way. If, for example, the device length is 10 cm, the pulse will travel
through the material for roughly 770 ps, making the maximum speed of the device around
1.3 GHz. This is not fast enough for many practical applications, hence the electrodes are
modified to ensure radio frequency (RF) signals travel through the device at the same speed
as the light pulses. These devices are known as travelling wave modulators and can operate
up to 40 GHz.
The half-wave voltages of LiNbO3 phase modulators is around 4-6 V, which often
necessitates the use of RF electrical amplifiers [64], increasing the system complexity. It
would make sense to increase the device length to decrease the half-wave voltage, however
they are already of the order of 10 cm when packaged and impedance matching issues will
occur if the length is increased. Another problem with these devices with regard to QKD is
their loss, which is 0.2 dB/cm in the best case scenario [65]. Consequently, if the device is
on one arm of an interferometer, as is the case for a BB84 transmitter, the other arm must be
attenuated to create equal losses along each arm.
Organic electro-optic materials show promise for small footprint, low voltage and high
bandwidth phase modulators [66]. When functioning, they are a better alternative to LiNbO3,
however they suffer from thermal and photochemical effects [67]. Accordingly, they are
unreliable unless carefully packaged. This is a difficult process that increases the device
size. Another issue is that it is challenging to grow the organic materials with high optical
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quality [68]. LiNbO3 devices are thus favourable for practical applications, and are found in
many QKD systems.
1.3.5 Phase demodulation
The phase difference between light pulses is not a directly measurable property, so this
information must be retrieved indirectly. This is possible by sending a pair of light pulses
with a phase shift ∆φ through an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) with a
variable phase delay on one arm. In this device, the light pulses are split equally into a fast
and a slow path. The phase of the pulse in the fast path is modified in a controllable manner,
whilst the pulse in the slow path is delayed by an amount equal to the separation between
pulses.
There are two output ports from the AMZI, with light pulses in three separate time bins.
The first (third) time bin comes from the first (second) incident light pulse travelling through
the fast (slow) AMZI path. The middle time bin is the useful one, and is caused by the first
pulse travelling through the slow path and the second pulse travelling through the fast path
and then interfering at the output. This means the exit port of the middle time bin is defined
by the phase difference between these pulses, which is ∆φ added to the phase shift incurred
by the pulses as they travel in different paths. A train of coherent pulses can be made to all
exit through the same port by tuning the phase delay on one path. The extinction ratio of
light between the two exit ports can then be measured and used as a figure of merit for the
phase coherence of the pulses.
A planar lightwave circuit (PLC) AMZI with a silica waveguide and a delay of 500 ps
is used throughout this thesis. A fibre-based AMZI could also be used, however they are
far more susceptible to changes in the ambient conditions, requiring complex tracking and
compensation to stabilise. The entire silicon substrate on the PLC AMZI can be temperature
controlled using thermoelectric cooling, meaning the device is resilient to ambient changes.
A thermal phase shifter on one AMZI path tunes the phase delay between the paths. The
main drawback of using the PLC AMZI compared to a fibre-based AMZI is the increased
insertion loss. This is minimised by the use of a silica waveguide to match the optical fibre.
At various points over the course of my PhD, the loss of this device was measured between 2
and 3 dB, depending on the experiment. This could be due to different couplers being used,




Randomness is the absence of predictability, meaning there is no pattern. It is a prerequisite
for a number of parts in QKD systems. Firstly, for QKD to be secure, the key Alice prepares
must be random. Secondly, Alice and Bob must randomly choose a separate encoding and
measurement basis for each bit in BB84. Also, if discrete variable QKD is carried out using
weak coherent pulses, the global phase of each signal should be random to maximise the
secure key rate [69, 70, 71]. For example, in a phase-encoded implementation of BB84, the
information is encoded between a reference pulse and a signal pulse, but the global phase of
this pulse pair must be random.
To describe why this is the case, consider a laser emitting coherent states |α⟩ with n










µeiθ , where µ is the mean photon number and θ is the phase. If the phase of
the state is completely random and Eve has no knowledge of it, then the measurement result






If the phase is not completely random then the state cannot be described in this way and thus
Eve can obtain information from multi-photon pulses [71, 72].
Randomness in practice
In many systems, pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) are used to generate random
numbers. These utilise an algorithm to create a set of random numbers from a seed state [73,
74]. A PRNG will always produce the same sequence from each seed state. Whilst this can
be used to produce random numbers at a very high rate, they are not true random numbers,
meaning the sequence will repeat after a certain number of bits. If a PRNG is used for a QKD
system, the security is reduced because an eavesdropper who knows about the implementation
of the number generation could theoretically exploit it [75, 76].
A true random number generator is necessary for QKD to ensure the security is not
compromised. Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) are based on the fundamental
randomness of physical processes [77] and provide us with the most obvious choice for QKD
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systems. They have been proven to reliably produce perfectly random sequences at high
speeds [78]. Recent work has shown the extraction of random numbers from a QRNG at a
rate of 8 GBit/s continuously over 71 days, which is sufficient for QKD applications [79].
1.3.7 Finite-key-size analysis
Alice and Bob will perform QKD until they have built a raw key block of a certain size, say
106 bits. They will then perform post processing on this block. If they do this on many of
these blocks, they will observe that the experimental parameters, i.e. the number of counts
and the error rate, will have statistical fluctuations. This is known as the finite-key-size
effect [69, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85].
One way of dealing with these variations is to use the worst case scenario of the observed
counts and error rate distribution. This involves assuming a normal distribution of the count
rate and error counts, with a standard deviation defined by the block size. The tail end of
these counts (usually lower for count rate and upper for error counts) can then be used in
the secure key rate estimations. Better bounds can be placed on these fluctuations by taking
advantage of various mathematical inequalities [86, 87].
According to the central limit theorem, the larger the block size used, the sharper these
distributions will be. An asymptotic analysis is where no finite-key-size effects are accounted
for, which would be the case for an infinitely large block. To this end, it is best to use the
largest possible block sizes for post processing to reduce the statistical fluctuations.
1.3.8 Single photon detectors
SPDs are the most expensive and complex part of any DV or DPR QKD system. This is
because they must be able to efficiently detect incident photons (or true positives), whilst
ensuring they do not record a detection at any unintended times (or false positives). There
have been significant advances to SPD technology that have allowed QKD to be demonstrated
with reasonable secure key rates. The performance of SPDs can be characterised by a number
of figure of merits [88]:
• Efficiency, η , is the probability of the detector registering a click given an incident
photon. It is vitally important that this parameter is high due to the small mean photon
number transmitted by Alice and the photon loss in the channel.
• Dark count rate is the number of detections per second given no light input. This is
a difficult parameter to control, often requiring cooling the detectors and fibre near
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the detectors to limit thermal photons. Other techniques such as wavelength filtering
and polarisers can be used to reduce the dark count rate. These counts can be the
limiting factor for producing a secure key at long distances when they are produced at
a comparable level to those sent by Alice.
• Dead-time is the time after registering an event that the detector cannot operate. This
can be the limiting factor for the maximum count rate the detectors can handle.
• Timing jitter is the uncertainty in the registered measurement time of an incident
photon. High jitter values cause intersymbol interference, increasing the QBER.
Three single photon detector technologies are outlined in this section: single photon
avalanche photodiodes (SPADs), transition edge sensor (TES) SPDs and superconducting
nanowire SPDs (SNSPDs). The first can be operated at room temperature, whereas the latter
two both require supercooling. State of the art results for all three detector types are outlined
in Table 1.2.
Single photon avalanche photodiodes
SPADs are the same in design as ordinary avalanche photodiodes (APDs). In APDs, a p-n
junction is operated with a large reverse bias and incident light creates electron-hole pairs.
The high bias causes them to accelerate towards the electrodes, ionising other carriers in
the multiplication layer due to their energy. All of these ionised carriers travel towards the
electrodes, creating a higher current than ordinary photodiodes. SPADs use a much higher
reverse bias to ordinary APDs, giving them a higher sensitivity. InGaAs is commonly used
as the active material for these detectors due to its band gap around telecommunication
wavelengths.
SPADs are typically biased below their breakdown voltage, relying on a short pulse
of large reverse bias at the same time as incident photons to act as a ‘gate’ to detect the
photon. This is known as ‘gated mode’, however it incurs a large amount of noise from
spurious avalanches due to carriers that have been trapped by defects [89]. This limits the
gating frequency. Yuan et al [89] developed a method known as ‘self-differencing’ to reduce
the noise, allowing a higher count rate to be achieved. This technique splits the electrical
response from the detector into two, delays one and then subtracts it from the other, removing
the capacitive response from the signal.
Afterpulsing is a negative effect seen in SPADs where a single photon event will create
multiple detection events. This is due to avalanche carriers becoming trapped in deep levels of
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the semiconductor band structure, causing a delayed response. It can cause an overestimation
of the count rate of up to 10 % [90], and increases the measured QBER.
SPADs tend to have a lower efficiency and higher dark count rate than other SPDs,
however even with these properties and afterpulsing, they are commonly used in QKD
systems. This is because they are reliable, compact, cost-effective and can be operated at
room temperature.
Transition edge sensors
TES SPDs measure the resistance change as a photon incident on a thin layer of supercon-
ducting material causes the material to transition between its superconducting and conducting
state. [88]. These detectors can be highly efficient with a low dark count rate. Unfortunately,
however, their maximum count rate is low, they have to be operated as mK temperatures, and
they have a slow response time. The main property prohibiting their usage in QKD systems
is their large timing jitter, which can be up to 100 ns, making the maximum clock rate far
lower than in other detection systems [88].
Superconducting nanowire single photon detectors
SNSPDs are another popular choice for QKD experiments. These have a nanowire patterned
on a substrate, which is cooled to a level such that the material is in a superconducting
state [91]. The device is then biased close to its critical current. This current means that
incident photons create a hotspot in the material, creating a change in the resistance and thus
a measurable voltage pulse with a high time resolution.
The nanowire can be patterned such that the effective collection area is large, giving the
detectors very high efficiencies. The low temperatures (around 4 K) also ensure the dark
count rates are low, but also means the devices are expensive to operate. This being said, the
temperature is not quite as low as in TESs, meaning closed-cycle cooling technology can be
used [91]. Also, the material reverts to its initial state rapidly after the voltage pulse, giving
low deadtimes.
SNSPDs are used for all protocols demonstrated in this thesis. They are characterised
before each experiment, with their efficiency varying between 34-38 % and their dark count
rate between 10-30 Hz, depending on the experiment. They have a maximum count rate
around 38 MHz, however the timing jitter dramatically increases at count rates above 10 MHz,
making them unsuitable for QKD at high count rates.
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Table 1.2 State of the art SPDs at 1550 nm. TES: transition edge sensor; SD-SPAD:
self-differenced SPAD.
Detector type Efficiency (%) DCR (Hz) Max. count rate (MHz) Temp (K)
SNSPD [92] 93 1 25 0.8
SNSPD [93] 0.4 0.001 – 0.4
TES [94] 89 400 0.05 0.11
TES [95] 95 – 1 0.1
SD-SPAD [96] 45 94000 500 293
SD-SPAD [96] 10 480 500 243
Gated-SPAD [97] 9.6 200 20 183
Gated-SPAD [98] 10 875 125 228
1.3.9 Current state-of-the-art and future potential
The highest secure key rate achieved comes from Yuan et al., who demonstrate 13.7 Mbit/s
with continuous operation over 4.4 days and a 2 dB channel [99]. This is made possible
by using detector electronics with a high saturation rate that can process raw counts at fast
speeds, removing bottlenecks with sifting, error correction and privacy amplification. In 2015,
the longest distance for two-party QKD over optical fibre was demonstrated at 307 km [86].
This is achieved using detectors with a low dark count rate (0.9 Hz) and ultra low-loss optical
fibres (0.16 dB/km), however the COW protocol is used, which does not have security against
coherent attacks. Very recently, however, this record has been broken. Boaron et al. use ultra
low-loss fibres, with even lower dark count rate detectors (0.1 Hz) and a clock rate of 2.5
GHz, to demonstrate QKD with security against coherent attacks over 421 km of optical
fibre [100]. Previously, the record distance for the same protocol was 240 km [101], although
it should be noted that this demonstration does not use cryogenic detectors. MDI-QKD has
also been demonstrated over a distance of 404 km ultra low-loss optical fibre and 311 km of
standard optical fibre [102].
Multi-user QKD networks are certain to be important in proving the practicality and
enabling broader uptake of the technology. This would allow many users to be connected
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with secure links. To this end, many networks have been implemented around the world, for
example in America [103], Austria [104], South Africa [105], Switzerland [106], Japan [107],
China [108] and England [109]. Some of these have indeed been used to transfer sensitive
data between nodes. Swissquantum operated their QKD network for two years between three
separate nodes in Geneva, whilst the network in Tokyo allowed secure TV conferencing over
a distance of 45 km with help from nine organisations
Satellite QKD has seen a huge development in the past few years [52]. A landmark
experimental demonstration by Liao et al. in 2017 demonstrated kilobit per second secure
key rates over a distance of 1200 km using the Micius satellite [110]. As mentioned in
Section 1.3.2, these enormous distances are reachable because of the negligible loss above
the Earth’s atmosphere. This experiment opens the door to secure communications over a
global scale if users are willing to pay enough.
Low-cost and mobile QKD is also being explored in chip-based [111] and handheld
systems [112, 113, 114]. Chip-based QKD is important for the wider uptake of the technology,
allowing many components to be integrated together on a single device. This should bring
down the cost of QKD components because it enables mass-production. The two technologies
combined would allow for QKD to be implemented within mobile devices. This could
demand docking stations to ensure the transmitter and receiver are aligned to maximise
secure rates, making the application a little impractical.
One of the most recent advances in the field has come from the proposal of twin-field
QKD (TF-QKD) by Lucamarini et al [115]. This protocol is similar to MDI-QKD, in that an
untrusted third party is used, but uses first order interference from two transmitters instead of
second order interference. This allows the secure key rate to scale with the square root of
channel transmittance, enabling secure QKD over a longer distance than even decoy-state
QKD. The protocol has generated a lot of discussion and activity in the field because of its
potential [116, 117, 118, 119]. With current technology, TF-QKD would enable secure keys
to be generated over the entire length of England.
1.4 Motivation for research
A metropolitan quantum network with all users linked would require transmitters to have
separate hardware for each protocol and clock rate adopted by the various receivers. The
motivation behind this thesis is to develop a quantum transmitter that is able to adapt to
a number of different weak coherent pulse based QKD protocols with no changes to the
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hardware. This would greatly simplify future quantum networks. The transmitter would
desirably be small, versatile and energy efficient.
1.5 Novel contributions
This thesis develops a directly-modulated transmitter and applies it to QKD. The author has
made the following novel contributions:
• Phase modulation has been shown using an optically injection locked system with a
half-wave voltage of 0.35 V applied to laser diodes with a 50 Ω bias tee. This is the
lowest recorded half-wave voltage for a phase modulator and has been shown at a clock
rate of 2 GHz. The injection locking also has the benefit of reducing the pulse jitter.
• On-demand phase randomisation has been achieved using this system. Any pulse in a
pattern can be given a random phase by driving the phase preparation laser below its
lasing threshold. This is a requirement in a number of QKD protocols, and ordinarily
either requires an unstable asymmetric Mach-Zehnder configuration in the transmitter
or a random number generator and phase modulator. The randomness was tested by
looking at the distribution of values and the autocorrelation functions.
• Three phase modulated QKD protocols have been demonstrated. The differential phase
shift protocol has been implemented with a QBER of 1.70 %. The BB84 protocol has
also been implemented, with a QBER of 2.03 %, along with the first ever experimental
demonstration of the differential quadrature phase shift protocol. This was shown to
achieve 2.71 times the secure key rate of BB84.
• Accurate intensity modulation has been shown with the directly-modulated transmitter,
whilst providing a coherent phase to the pulses. The coherent one way protocol has
been implemented with high extinction ratio intensity modulation allowing a 0.20 %
QBER, alongside visibilities of 97.5 %.
• Concurrent phase and intensity encoding has been demonstrated with decoy-state
BB84. The directly-modulated transmitter showed the ability to produce vacuum
states accurately, however was unable to directly produce the decoy states without side
channels. A patterning-effect-free Sagnac intensity modulator was therefore developed
in order to provide the decoy states, with the directly-modulated transmitter giving the
signal and vacuum states. This experiment allowed the first direct comparison between
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polar BB84, which uses intensity and phase encoding, and phase-encoded BB84. This
showed a 1.60 times improvement when using polar BB84, although it requires an
extra intensity modulator to equalise the number of photons in each basis.
1.6 Organisation of thesis
This thesis is organised such that properties of the directly-modulated transmitter are explored
and then applied to various QKD protocols. Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to
cryptography and QKD. Different QKD protocols, how practical QKD has developed and
also single photon detector technologies are detailed. Chapter 2 introduces the directly phase-
modulated transmitter, describing how it works and characterising the spectra, visibility,
half-wave voltage and the potential to provide on-demand phase randomisation. Chapter 3
details how the transmitter can be used to implement three different phase-encoded QKD
protocols: differential phase shift, BB84 and differential quadrature phase shift. Chapter 4
looks at time-bin encoding, specifically showing intensity modulation by patterning the slave
laser. The coherent one way protocol is implemented. Chapter 5 combines the properties
explored in the previous two chapters, looking at concurrent phase and intensity modulation.
Decoy-state BB84 is implemented with the X-Z bases and the X-Y bases for comparison. A
stable two-level low extinction ratio intensity modulator based on a Sagnac interferometer is
developed in this chapter to enable production of the decoy states with no side channels.

Chapter 2
A directly-modulated quantum light
source
2.1 Introduction
In this section the operating principles of a directly-modulated transmitter that can be used
for weak coherent pulse based QKD protocols will be outlined. The transmitter turns out to
have many advantages over standard QKD transmitters.
2.1.1 Laser diodes
Lasers are light sources that can produce highly monochromatic, coherent and collimated
light beams [120, pp. 33–45]. Within a laser there is a gain medium surrounded by reflective
mirrors, forming an optical cavity to confine photons. There are three processes involving
light inside this gain medium, as shown in Fig. 2.1a. For ease of explanation, it is assumed
the gain medium has two energy levels, E1 and E2, where ∆E = E2 −E1. The first process
is absorption, which is where a photon of energy ∆E is absorbed by an electron, exciting
the electron from the lower to the higher energy level. The second is spontaneous emission,
which is the random decay of an electron from the higher energy level to a lower energy
level, producing a photon with energy ∆E, a random phase and travelling in a random spatial
direction. This decay has a characteristic time constant according to the material. The third
process is stimulated emission. Stimulated emission is where an incoming photon with
energy ∆E causes the transition of a photon in the upper level to decay to the lower level.
This produces two coherent photons, travelling in the same direction, with the same energy.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 2.1 Laser fundamentals. a) The three processes involving light in a laser gain medium.
b) The inside of a DFB laser diode, where a periodic grating above the active medium only
allows certain wavelengths to oscillate. Laser light exits through the port on the right.
The device is said to be lasing when the gain overcomes the losses in the cavity. These
losses are caused by output coupling from the reflective mirrors, along with undesirable
features such as absorption in optical components and scattering. The gain is the amplification
of light inside the cavity and is proportional to the population inversion density (the difference
in carriers in the upper and lower energy levels per metre cubed). When population inversion
is achieved, stimulated emission can amplify the light in the gain medium, which oscillates
between the reflective mirrors and creates further amplification. One of the mirrors has a
slightly lower reflectivity, allowing a coherent light beam to be transmitted from the cavity.
The exact method of achieving population inversion depends on the gain medium, but always
requires some form of external energy injection to ‘pump’ carriers in the gain medium to a
higher level.
The properties of the output laser light are highly dependent on the physical design of the
laser. The gain medium, for example can be a gas, chemical, doped fibre, semiconductor,
amongst other materials. This can change the output wavelength, power and mode of
operation.
Semiconductor lasers are the most popular type of laser for telecommunications [120,
pp. 48–71]. These use direct band-gap semiconductor materials with an active layer in
between p-type and n-type layers. They are commonly electrically pumped using a strong
forward bias, with electrons (holes) injected into the n-region (p-region) to create population
inversion. Recombination of electrons and holes in the i-region creates photons. Their popu-
larity in telecommunications is because they can emit efficiently at fibre-optic wavelengths
(1310 nm and 1550 nm), they are small, easy to produce and package, can output milliwatt
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powers, they can often be driven at GHz speeds, and they have a long lifetime. Also, the
refractive index can be varied by changing the temperature of the diode, which shifts the
cavity resonance wavelength. This gives a simple method of tuning the emission wavelength.
Semiconductor distributed feedback lasers (DFB) (see Fig. 2.1b) are a type of laser that is
commonly used in optical communications [121]. This is because they have high modulation
bandwidths, narrow spectral linewidths and are stable. These features are particularly useful
in high-speed dense wavelength division multiplexing systems, where the wavelength should
not overlap into neighbouring channels. The laser contains some form of patterned one-
dimensional structure that acts as a Bragg reflector, reflecting a small range of wavelengths
for amplification. This ensures the output light is in a single longitudinal mode and is highly
monochromatic.
2.1.2 Optical injection locking
Injection locking is where two oscillators with similar frequencies adopt the same frequency
and phase. The phenomenon was first discovered by Christian Huygens when he noticed that
two pendulum clocks oscillate in phase with one another when close together on a common
surface, but not when far apart [122]. This was found to be due to small vibrations caused by
the clocks that induced a coupling between the two oscillators [123]. In the 1920s, it was
discovered that the behaviour of an electrical oscillator could be modified by applying an
external signal, in a manner similar to that found by Huygens. The differential equations
defining this electrical injection locking were outlined in 1946 by Adler [124].
It is natural to extend this analysis to lasers, another form of oscillator. In this process,
known as optical injection locking (OIL), light from a seed, or ‘master’, laser is sent into the
cavity of an isolator-free ‘slave’ laser. The slave laser then emits light of the same frequency
and phase as the seed laser. This is dependent on the frequency detuning, ∆ν , between the
two free-running lasers being small, and sufficient power being injected into the slave laser.
This occurs because external photons with an energy E1 close to the free-running energy of
the slave cavity, E2, act as the seed for stimulated emission at an energy E1. This also means
the emitted photons will have the same phase as the master laser photons. The process is
described by a set of differential equations for S(t), the slave laser photon number, N(t), the
slave laser carrier number and φ(t) the difference between the phase of the slave and master
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dN(t)
dt











Here, g is the gain coefficient of the slave laser, Ntr is the carrier number at transparency,
γP is the photon decay rate, κ is the coupling rate, Sinj is the number of injected photons,
J(t) is the current injected to the slave laser, γN is the carrier recombination rate and α is
the linewidth enhancement factor of the laser. Whilst the specifics of these equations are
not important in this thesis, it is important to note the coupling between the equations. The
injected light field does not have a direct impact on the carrier density equation, however it
does change the photon density, which then changes the carrier density. Also note that the
two master laser parameters that can be tuned to change the output properties are injected
power and frequency detuning.
Benefits of optical injection locking
A number of favourable properties of optically injection locked systems have led to the
technique being used extensively in classical optics.
Laser linewidth is the full width half-maximum of the laser spectrum. Finite linewidths
can be caused by spontaneous emission of photons into resonant cavity modes, and also by
the coupling between intensity and phase noise (defined by α in Eq. 2.3) in semiconductor
lasers. This coupling occurs because the refractive index of semiconductor lasers depends
on the carrier density. OIL can reduce the slave laser linewidth to that of the master laser
because the phase noise is inherited by the slave laser [127, 128]. The master laser can have
a narrow linewidth because it can be driven far above its threshold where spontaneous
emission is negligible. Narrow linewidths can be highly desirable in coherent optical
communications [129]. This is due to the inverse dependence of temporal coherence on
linewidth, meaning that a decrease in linewidth increases the coherence of the output,
increasing the signal-to-noise ratio.
Semiconductor lasers experience relaxation oscillations due to the interplay between
carrier density and photon density in the cavity. Applying a current pulse to the laser cavity
injects a large number of carriers at a time where there are a low number of photons. This
causes a large number of photons to be produced, reducing the number of carriers. This in
turn causes a reduction in the photon number, and an increase in the carrier number. These
two factors oscillate back and forth at a certain frequency until the steady-state condition
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is reached, limiting the modulation speed of the system. OIL can improve this situation by
using a large injection power and varying the frequency detuning to create a beating between
the injected field and the slave laser cavity frequency, which then dominates the modulation
dynamics and increases the resonant frequency (from a maximum of around 30 GHz to
100 GHz) [130, 131].
When directly modulating a laser diode, the carrier density inside the cavity is changed,
which modifies the refractive index of the gain medium. This causes a time-varying change
in the wavelength of the emitted light, which is equivalent to saying the laser is chirped. This
can be caused by the laser relaxation oscillations when the laser reacts to sharp changes in
the applied current. A chirped laser can have a broad range of wavelengths, meaning that
chromatic dispersion will cause the symbols to temporally spread out in optical fibre, creating
intersymbol interference at the receiver. This increases the bit error rate and thus limits the
transmission rate. OIL minimises this chirp because the slave laser wavelength is locked to
that of a continuous wave (CW) master laser, enhancing the possible transmission rate [127].
Relative intensity noise is the variation in the output power of a laser about its average
power. This is caused predominantly by spontaneous emission. The slave cavity acts as a
resonant amplifier to the injected master light, without adding any spontaneous emission.
This means the output power is more stable than the original free-running output of the slave
laser [132, 133].
Time jitter is where a pulse train does not have perfect periodicity, meaning pulses may
arrive at different times within gates of a gated detector. This effect is prominent in gain
switched lasers (described in the next section) because spontaneous emission is the dominant
emission process for lasers below their lasing threshold. This means the carrier and photon
density in the cavity is randomly fluctuating, hence will be at a random level at the start of
each electrical pulse. Subsequently, the amount of time required to build up a positive gain
resulting in a pulse will vary randomly [134, pp. 595–597]. OIL can be used to significantly
reduce this jitter because the externally injected light helps to balance out fluctuations in the
cavity [135].
Whilst the technique has been extensively used in classical communications, very limited
research has gone into how it can improve quantum communications. Comandar et al [136]
define ‘pulsed laser seeding’ for polarisation-encoded MDI-QKD. Here, both the master and
slave laser are pulsed, but the master laser is above threshold for longer. By doing this, the
output pulses can be locked to the steady state region of the master laser pulses, minimising
the frequency chirp and time jitter, whilst ensuring the pulse phase is random and the pulse
width is small. These conditions give a high quality second order interference between two
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independent lasers and allow for the demonstration of the first megabit per second MDI-QKD
system. In this thesis, OIL is primarily used for the phase inheritance, but the system is
enhanced by the aforementioned properties that are beneficial in classical communications.
2.1.3 Pulse preparation
QKD deals with weak coherent pulses, thus the light source must be separated into pulses
somehow. Fortunately, methods of pulse preparation have been well-researched because there
are myriad uses for light pulses. For example, pulsed light can be used in telecommunications,
for precise optical clocks [137] and even to study femtosecond chemical reactions [138].
In normal operation, the longitudinal modes in a laser oscillate independently. In a
mode-locked laser, the phase relationship between all the longitudinal modes is constant,
meaning they will periodically interfere with each other to create light pulses. The periodicity
is proportional to the cavity length (and also, therefore, to the inverse of the spacing between
lasing modes). Mode-locking can be active, for example where an intensity modulator is
placed in the cavity to periodically modulate the cavity loss, or passive, for example where a
saturable absorber is placed in the cavity. This process can be used to generate ultrashort
and coherent light pulses, however the lasers can often be quite large, and the output can be
unstable and noisy.
Gain switching is a more reliable method of pulse production than mode-locking, although
it does create longer pulses with no phase relationship between one another [121]. Here,
current is applied to a laser that is below its lasing threshold, and then quickly turned off
when the laser is above its threshold. This happens because the injection of carriers into the
laser cavity brings the device rapidly above the lasing threshold, generating many stimulated
emission photons. This photon production depletes the laser cavity, at which point the current
is turned off, thus stopping any subsequent emission. It is so-called due to the gain being
briefly brought above the cavity losses, before rapidly being lower again. Gain-switching
produces phase-randomised pulses because each pulse is stimulated from below threshold,
which also explains why the pulses suffer from a high jitter. This loss of coherence can be
beneficial in some QKD applications, as described in Section 2.2.6.
Pulses can also be produced externally by passing continuous wave laser light through
a Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM) or an electroabsorption modulator (EAM). MZMs
split the light into two separate paths, with electro-optic phase modulators in each arm.
Complementary phase shifts are applied to the light in each arm, giving precise control
of the interference of the light as the paths are recombined at the output. EAMs utilise
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semiconductors, which have an effective band gap energy that decreases with voltage. By
using a material that has a band gap around the wavelength used, voltage changes can be
used to control the output intensity of light. EAMs are attractive because they require far
lower driving voltages than MZMs, however they only work over a small wavelength range,
they often have a higher loss than MZMs and also a higher extinction ratio can only be
achieved with a longer device, which can be prohibitive. External intensity modulators are
desirable because they often have a higher modulation bandwidth than direct modulation
and a lower chirp, although they increase the device complexity and cost. Using OIL does
improve the characteristics of gain-switched lasers, however they are still not as good as
external modulators.
Some QKD protocols require a phase-randomised pulse source, meaning gain-switching
is the optimal solution. Other pulse-preparation methods would require extra components for
phase randomisation. For QKD protocols that use a coherent phase, external modulators are
often a better choice than mode locking due to their simplicity.
2.2 System design and properties
As QKD systems are commercialised, it is important that they are both compact and cheap.
This means it would be highly favourable to use direct modulation in the transmitter rather
than having to rely on external modulators. As pointed out in Section 1.3.4, side channels
that could be exploited by an eavesdropper are easily introduced if care is not taken with
direct modulation. Some modification is required, for example carving out the side channels
with an intensity modulator, as shown by Hentschel et al [139]. Unfortunately, this still
requires high-speed external modulation, it is simply performing a different task.
This section describes a quantum transmitter based entirely on the direct-modulation of
two laser diodes. Optical injection locking of these lasers is exploited to remove the side
channels that would ordinarily prohibit the use of direct modulation in QKD systems.
2.2.1 Transmitter design
The most important elements of the directly-modulated transmitter are two InGaAsP/InP
multi-quantum well DFB laser diodes connected by a polarisation-maintaining circulator.
Both lasers have a built-in bias tee, allowing an AC and DC to be simultaneously applied.
They have a specified central wavelength of 1550 nm, a 1 MHz linewidth and a modulation
bandwidth of 10 GHz. The circulator is a non-reciprocal passive device with three ports:
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light entering port 1 exits through port 2 and light entering port 2 exits through port 3. The
isolation for light in all other directions is specified as >50 dB. The master laser is labelled
as the ‘phase preparation’ laser and is placed at port 1 of the circulator. The slave laser is
labelled as the ‘pulse preparation’ laser and is placed at port 2 of the circulator. The pulse
preparation laser does not have an in-built isolator, thus light from the phase preparation laser
is injected into the pulse preparation laser. Emission from the pulse preparation laser exits
through port 3 of the circulator.
A schematic of the complete transmitter is shown in Fig. 2.2. The phase preparation laser
is operated above threshold, so the light must be attenuated before injection into the pulse
preparation laser. This is done using a non polarisation-maintaining digital attenuator. Both
lasers have an output polarisation parallel to the slow axis, so injected light must also be
in the same axis. To ensure this, and also to allow for a quick measurement of the injected
power, an electric polarisation controller (EPC) aligns the light output from the attenuator
into the slow axis of a polarising beamsplitter (PBS) by minimising the power into a power
meter on the fast axis of the PBS. A polarisation-maintaining attenuator could be used to
reduce the size and complexity of this system, however the described setup makes system
measurements simpler while the system is being tested. A spectral filter is placed at port 3 of
the attenuator to increase the quality of phase demodulation.
Fig. 2.2 Experimental setup. Directly-phase modulated transmitter design. LD=laser
diode; Att=attenuator; EPC=electric polarisation controller; PBS=polarising beamsplitter;
λ=wavelength filter. A circulator (with port numbers labelled) injects the light from the first
LD into the second. Blue fibres are polarisation-maintaining, whereas yellow fibres are not.
The laser temperature is controlled using thermoelectric cooling. This is where a current
is applied between two surfaces and the heat is transferred from one surface to the other by
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the Peltier effect. This current is applied by a temperature controller with stability below
0.002◦C and ensures the laser wavelength is insensitive to external temperature fluctuations.
2.2.2 Gain switched laser pulses
The pulses are produced by gain-switching, as described in Section 2.1.3. This creates very
jittery pulses, as shown in Fig. 2.3 (top), with a high chirp and a random phase. Adding a
spectral filter helps remove some noise, as shown by the second profile in Fig. 2.3, however
the jitter can be further reduced by injecting a coherent laser, as shown by the bottom two
traces. The pulse width is slightly broadened with the addition of the spectral filter because
the pulse preparation laser temperature has to be varied to ensure maximum power output.
The output pulse width is 61.5 ps with the 12 GHz spectral filter and the root mean square
jitter is 2.20 ps. This is measured using a fast sampling scope with an optical bandwidth of
80 GHz and a sampling jitter of 425 fs. The small pulse width, combined with the low jitter,
mean that the errors caused by a pulse entering the adjacent time bins will be minimal.
Fig. 2.3 Gain-switched laser pulses. Pulse profiles created by gain-switching the pulse
preparation laser at 2 GHz. The DC bias is varied so the area under the pulses is similar
with and without injection. The top two traces have no optical injection and are shown with
and without a spectral filter. The bottom two traces have optical injection and are also shown
with and without a spectral filter.
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2.2.3 Spectra
The spectra of the various lasers are measured using a high-resolution (0.04 pm) optical
spectrum analyser. The panels in Fig. 2.4 show the free running pulse preparation laser
spectrum, the free running phase preparation laser spectrum, and the spectrum after injection.
Free running in this situation means that the lasers are unmodulated and have no light injected
into them. Identical laser diodes are used as the phase and pulse preparation lasers, however
the figure shows that the linewidth of the phase preparation laser is narrower. This is because,
whilst both lasers are driven above their lasing threshold, the phase preparation laser is driven
further above threshold than the pulse preparation laser. This means it has a lower noise
because it has a higher ratio of stimulated to spontaneous emission.
This figure also allows us to see how the laser responds to external injection at different
detuning frequencies, where ∆ f is defined as the phase preparation laser frequency minus the
pulse preparation laser frequency. Fig. 2.4a demonstrates the situation where the detuning is
so large that the output with injection contains components of both the original wavelengths.
As the detuning is reduced, the situation changes to that shown in Fig. 2.4b, where the
output with injection is solely at the phase preparation laser wavelength, signifying that
the system is locked. The weakness of this locking due to the large detuning is visible
because the linewidth of the output with injection shows only a small enhancement over the
free-running pulse preparation laser. When the detuning is just -0.2 GHz, as in Fig. 2.4c, the
lasers are completely locked. The linewidth of the output is enhanced to match that of the
phase preparation laser, and the emission is at the same wavelength as the phase preparation
laser. At a negative detuning, shown in Fig. 2.4d, the same situation as for a similar positive
detuning in Fig. 2.4a can be observed.
When the pulse preparation laser is gain-switched with DC below the lasing threshold,
the output pulses have no phase relation, as shown by the ‘pulse preparation only’ curve in
Fig. 2.5. Upon injection of external coherent laser light into the pulse preparation laser cavity,
the output pulses inherit phase coherence. The result of this is an ‘optical frequency comb’,
and can be seen in the ‘with injection’ curve in Fig. 2.5. This is created because the Fourier
transform of an infinitely long train of perfectly spaced pulses at the same wavelength with a
perfectly coherent phase is a set of equally spaced delta functions. The spacing of these delta
functions is equal to the laser modulation frequency, which is 2 GHz in this demonstration.
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Fig. 2.4 Unmodulated laser spectra. Unfiltered spectra for free running phase preparation
and pulse preparation laser diodes as the pulse preparation laser wavelength is varied to
provide different detunings. All lasers have a DC bias above their lasing threshold. The
phase preparation laser spectrum is measured after attenuation to 50 µW. The detuning
frequencies are 29.3 GHz, 24.5 GHz, -0.2 GHz and -28.9 GHz for panels a, b, c and d
respectively.
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Fig. 2.5 Gain-switched laser spectra. Unfiltered spectra for a gain-switched pulse prepa-
ration laser, with and without CW phase preparation laser injection (also shown). The AC
voltage into the pulse preparation lasers is the same for both scenarios. The DC voltage is
below threshold in both scenarios, however is higher without injection, to allow comparison
in the plot.
2.2.4 Interference contrast and visibility
The output properties of the phase are of utmost importance for the system, so the quality of
the phase inheritance from the phase preparation laser to the pulse preparation laser must be
quantified. For this, an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) with a tuneable
phase delay on one arm is used to interfere consecutive pulses. The power out of one arm
of the AMZI is measured, noting the maximum and minimum (Pmax and Pmin respectively)
as the phase delay is tuned about 2π . This allows two important figures of merit to be
determined, the interference contrast (in dB):
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Interference contrast is useful to visualise the phase inheritance, whereas visibility is directly








This can be visualised using Fig. 2.6, where any error photons exit from the wrong port of
the interferometer.
Fig. 2.6 QBER origin. An AMZI is aligned to measure in one basis. Photons exiting through
the bottom port are contribute to the QBER.
In order to identify how the system responds to different phase preparation laser wave-
lengths, a high-resolution tuneable CW laser is injected into the pulse preparation laser. The
power out of the pulse preparation laser as a function of injected wavelength allows the
dominant lasing mode to be identified, along with any side modes. The interference contrast
can also be used to identify where the peak phase inheritance occurs.
Fig. 2.7a shows that the maximum power output due to locking occurs at 1550.1 nm,
aligning with the peak phase inheritance at 1550 nm shown in Fig 2.7b. The maximum
interference contrast is 28.3 dB, which would correspond to an equivalent QBER of 0.15 %.
The quoted DFB laser diode temperature tuning coefficient is -12.5 GHz/◦C, which is equal
to -100 pm/◦C. The thermoelectric cooler used to control the laser diode temperature has a
quoted stability of ±0.002 ◦C, meaning the laser diode is stable to ±200 fm. To increase
the equivalent QBER to 0.20 % would require a wavelength change of 50 pm, 250 times
higher than the laser stability, so it is extremely unlikely that ambient temperature changes
will impact the locking strength.
The interference contrast measurements for both types of laser used are shown in Fig. 2.8,
with a varied injection power. The pulses produced by a free-running gain-switched laser
have an inherently random phase because the lasing is produced from spontaneous emission
photons inside the cavity. This can be seen at low injection powers in Fig. 2.8 where the
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(a) Output power. (b) Output pulse interference contrast.
Fig. 2.7 Master wavelength variation. The pulse preparation laser is gain switched at
2 GHz and the output properties are measured as 50 µW of CW light at different wavelengths
is injected via a tuneable laser source.
interference contrast, and subsequently the visibility, are both zero. As the injection power
increases, the output pulses inherit the phase coherence of the phase preparation laser. The
tuneable laser has a narrower linewidth than the DFB laser diode. Laser coherence is inversely
proportional to the linewidth, meaning that the tuneable laser has a longer coherence time,
as is observed in the figure by a better interference contrast value. The coherence of the
laser diode is still high, with a visibility over 99 %, which would give the very low QBER of
0.5 %.
2.2.5 Phase modulation
Phase modulation can be realised with this system by applying short modulation pulses, of
size ∆I, to the phase preparation laser, which is free running with a current I. A change in
the phase preparation laser current to I +∆I will change the intensity, frequency and phase
evolution of the light injected into the pulse preparation laser. A change in intensity or
frequency depending on the desired phase shift will introduce a side channel that Eve can
use to exploit the system. With this in mind, the modulation pulses must occur between two
pulse preparation laser pulses, so that the current causing the gain switching is always I, thus
preventing any changes in intensity or frequency. The size of ∆I will determine the amount of
phase modulation applied. This concept is shown in Fig. 2.9. The practical implementation is
given in Fig. 2.10, with 0, π/2, π ,3π/2 modulations created by different modulation levels.
The phase preparation laser remains above threshold at all times to ensure the coherence is
not broken.
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Fig. 2.8 Interference contrast. Evolution of the interference contrast with the injected seed
power for a tuneable CW laser and a CW DFB laser diode. The pulse preparation laser is
gain-switched at 2 GHz. Solid lines show the measured coherence of the phase preparation
laser, whereas symbols show the system output with light injected into the pulse preparation
laser.
One of the most important figures of merit for a phase modulator is the half-wave voltage.
A repeated 0-∆φ pattern is input to the phase preparation laser and the 250 ps modulation
depth is varied. The voltage is applied to the laser diode through a 50 Ω bias tee. The
incurred phase shift is measured by tuning the AMZI phase delay and observing how the
two modulation levels evolve with respect to one another. Fig. 2.11 shows that the directly
phase-modulated transmitter has a half-wave voltage of 0.35 V. This is the lowest reported
value for any phase modulation system, and is around 10 times lower than in LiNbO3 phase
modulators (see Section 1.3.4).
This record-breaking half-wave voltage is made possible by the fundamental operating
principles of the system. The modulation to the phase preparation laser changes the carrier
density inside the cavity, which alters its refractive index, thus changing the phase shift
experienced by the photons. The photons inside the cavity oscillate multiple times through
this different refractive index, in contrast to a traditional phase modulator where the light only
makes one pass. This is the cavity-enhanced electro-optic effect and ensures that although
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Fig. 2.9 System concept. a) The frequency change, ∆ν , caused by a perturbation of length
tm to the driving signal, alongside b) the change in phase, ∆φ , compared to the original
phase without the perturbation and c) the subsequent output pulses, with a phase modulation,
but no change to the intensity or frequency.
the device length is around 100 µm, the effective interaction distance is around 25 mm when
the modulation time is 250 ps.
2.2.6 Practical phase randomisation
The directly-modulated transmitter removes the need for an extra phase randomisation step in
QKD protocols utilising weak coherent pulses. This is possible by exploiting the fundamental
physical properties of lasers. When a laser is emitting light above its lasing threshold, the
light is generated mainly by stimulated emission, a process that generates photons with a
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Fig. 2.10 Phase modulation. Shallow phase preparation laser modulations create arbitrary
phase modulations in the system output measured using an oscilloscope. a) Optical response
from the phase preparation laser; b) output from one arm of an AMZI.
Fig. 2.11 Half-wave voltage. The phase shift between output pulses as a function of phase
preparation laser modulation depth.
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coherent phase. When the laser is emitting light below its lasing threshold, however, the
system is dominated by spontaneous emission, a process with a completely random phase
evolution [140].
The phase coherence of a laser above threshold can be broken, therefore, by driving the
laser below threshold for long enough that spontaneous emission becomes dominant. When
the laser is then driven above threshold, it will start lasing with a random phase due to lasing
being seeded by a spontaneous emission photon. This can be seen when gain-switching a
laser diode, where each pulse is produced with a completely random phase. This principle
can be applied to the phase preparation laser before injection to the pulse preparation laser.
Because the pulse preparation laser inherits the phase of the phase preparation laser, output
pulses after a phase preparation laser modulation below threshold will have a globally random
phase, as shown in Fig. 2.12.
Fig. 2.12 Injection-locked phase randomness. Phase randomness can be arbitrarily pro-
vided to pulses at 2 GHz by driving the phase preparation laser below threshold. a) Optical
output from the phase preparation laser, showing depletion regions followed by peaks before
a steady state region. The applied electrical signal has a down-time of 250 ps, whereas the
optical down-time is around 200 ps. b) Colour-graded density plot of the output pulses after
an AMZI.
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Randomness testing
There are a number of tests that can be run to determine whether a set of numbers is truly
random [74]. A first basic test is to see if the data is uniformly distributed. This can be
tested by looking at a histogram of the produced values. A second test is to ensure the data
is independent, meaning there is no correlation between values. The independence of the
dataset can be described quantitatively by measuring the autocorrelation function (ACF) of
the data. This is the similarity of the dateset with respect to a delayed version of the same
dataset. The ACF of a discrete dataset, a, is defined as the covariance of a dataset with a









where x is the delay, also known as the lag, and L is the string size. In the implementation
in this thesis the data is normalised to have zero mean and unit variance, then the Matlab
function ‘xcorr’ is used to extract the ACF.
Although it is usually obvious from the ACF plot if there are any correlations, the distri-
bution across lags should also be tested, showing that there is no bias in the autocorrelations.
The autocorrelations should have a normal distribution about zero for a random string, al-
lowing confidence bounds to be determined for the probability of a point at each lag lying
within a certain interval. Bounds, P, for a given confidence level, α , and N samples, based







The larger the sample used for the autocorrelation, the tighter the bounds will be, meaning
a large sample should be used for more confidence in the result. Also, it should be noted
that the ACF will always be unity at a lag of zero, because the correlation of a function with
itself with no delay will be unity. For this reason, it is common practice to ignore the zero
lag value in plots.
Experimental Results
The experiments are carried out with a 2 GHz gain-switched pulse preparation laser and
a phase preparation laser injection power around 50 µW, with the phase preparation laser
modulated to provide pulses with a phase alternating between random and coherent. A
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negative applied voltage breaks the phase coherence of the phase preparation laser by
emptying the laser cavity. The setup produces an output power around 300 µW when there is
no detuning between the two laser diodes. Measurement of the phase is performed using an
AMZI with a one-bit time day in one arm. This will produce an intensity, I, proportional to
1+ cos∆φ , where ∆φ is the phase difference between consecutive pulses. Data is acquired
from classical signals through a photodiode logged on an oscilloscope and analysed in
Matlab.
In order to check the bulk data ‘looks’ random, the histogram of interference values for
pulses on either side of a coherence-breaking phase preparation laser pulse is taken. The data
is shown in Fig. 2.13. In a perfect system, the distribution would be symmetric, with narrow
peaks at ‘0’ and ‘1’ because ∆φ should have a uniform distribution. This is not observed in
practice however. In reality, both peaks are broadened, with broadening of the peak at ‘1’
being larger, meaning the height is less than that at ‘0’. To explain this, a simulation of the
physical system is implemented in Matlab by creating a uniform random array with values
between 0 and 2π and then calculating 1+cosφ for each value. Two random variables from
a normal distribution with a mean of zero are added to each array before calculating the
expected distribution after interference. The first has a constant standard deviation, which
accounts for the measurement uncertainty in the scope and any system fluctuations. The
second has a standard deviation proportional to the interference intensity, which accounts for
the linear intensity-dependent time-jitter of the pulses.
It is also useful to identify how long the laser needs to be below threshold to ensure the
phase is randomised. The resolution of the AWG is 24 GSamples/s, so the down-time lengths
are limited to multiples of 41.67 ps. The results for three different down-times are shown in
Fig. 2.13. A down-time of 42 ps produces a distinct phase, as shown by the interference not
spreading out over the entire phase range, meaning that there are many photons remaining in
the laser cavity between pulses. The shape looks similar to what is expected with a down-time
of 83 ps, however is biased towards lower intensities, meaning that there are still residual
photons in the laser cavity. A down-time of 125 ps is sufficient to empty the phase preparation
laser cavity and ensure the phase of the blocks is randomised. These experimental results fit
well with the simulation for this down-time value.
The second step involves looking at the ACF of the produced data. These are shown in
Fig. 2.14 for the inter-block interference in a BB84 pattern with 106 ‘0’ bits (ensuring no
randomness is added from the pattern) and are aligned with what is expected for random
data. There are no patterns in the ACF, and the values are distributed within the confidence
bounds for the dataset. This further confirms that the phase of the blocks is globally random.
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Fig. 2.13 Randomness histogram. Histograms of the random bits in a BB84 pattern
for different down-times to break the phase coherence of the phase preparation laser. A
simulation of the expected histogram is also given.

















Fig. 2.14 BB84 Autocorrelation. Inter-block interference only. The outer lines (red) show
99 % confidence bounds and the inner (blue) lines show 95 % confidence bounds.
48 A directly-modulated quantum light source
2.3 Summary
This chapter has outlined the optical injection locking of lasers and described some of
its favourable properties. Also, different methods of phase modulation, demodulation,
randomisation and laser pulse preparation are discussed. Bringing these ideas together, a
directly phase-modulated transmitter system based on optical injection locking is introduced.
Here, light is injected from a phase preparation laser into a 2 GHz gain-switched pulse
preparation laser, producing pulses with the same phase as the injected laser. The phase
coherence of the output pulses is measured through an interferometer with a one-bit delay. It
is shown that 50 µW of injected power from a CW DFB laser diode gives rise to a visibility
equivalent to a QBER of 0.5 %. As well as giving coherent pulses, the injection locking is
shown to drastically reduce the pulse jitter.
Next, the possibility for realising phase modulations to the output pulses is described
by applying small modulations to the phase preparation laser between gain-switched pulse
preparation laser pulses. The lowest reported half-wave voltage for a phase-modulation sys-
tem, of 0.35 V, is achieved using this system. This is possible due to the cavity enhancement
effect where light makes multiple passes through the laser cavity with a shifted refractive
index.
Finally, the necessity for phase randomisation in QKD is explored. It is shown that
the inherent randomness of lasers below their lasing threshold can be exploited in order to
produce arbitrary phase randomisation. A histogram of the interference between two pulses
with a random phase is analysed, and it is shown that a phase-preparation laser modulation
below the lasing threshold for 125 ps ensures the following locked pulse-preparation laser
pulse has a globally random phase. This result agrees with simulated data and the ACF of




As discussed in Chapter 1, there are a number of different QKD protocols that can be
implemented with phase modulation. In this chapter different methods of phase encoding are
introduced and three phase-encoded QKD protocols are demonstrated, each with different
requirements on the transmitter.
3.2 Phase encoding
Phase encoding is an efficient method of encoding information on light that is commonly used
in telecommunications, where it is called phase shift keying (PSK). PSK can be implemented
in two main ways. The first method, coherent PSK, requires coherent detection, which is
where the phase of a modulated signal is compared to that of a reference signal. This can
be difficult because precise knowledge of the drifting channel phase is required in order to
extract the modulated phase [142]. The second, known as differential PSK, is where the
transmitted signal is referenced with respect to another signal. More clearly, this means that
the phase shift of a signal is the difference between its phase and the phase of the previous
signal. This creates a simpler system by removing complexity from the receiver, although it
does introduce more errors than in ordinary PSK.
M phase levels allow log2(M) bits of information to be encoded per symbol, meaning
that more phase levels give a higher bandwidth efficiency. Commonly, two (binary PSK),
four (quadrature PSK) or 8 (octal PSK) phase levels are used. Any higher than this leads to
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diminishing returns because the signal-to-noise ratio will decrease as the points are closer to
one another, increasing the bit error rate.
QKD requires qubits to be encoded as orthonormal states in conjugate bases. This means
that there are two potential phase bases that can be used, with the same levels as in quadrature
PSK. The X basis contains the phases 0 and π; the Y basis contains the phases π2 and
3π
2 .
Phase-based DV protocols require a differential phase encoding, meaning an interferometer
must be used for demodulation, which often adds losses to the signal. This means that the
receiver for polarisation encoded QKD can be less lossy (see Section 1.3.4), although phase
encoding is far better for fibre optic applications due to the insensitivity to distortions in the
quantum channel.
3.3 Distributed phase shift
The traditional differential phase shift (DPS) protocol [143] is a distributed phase reference
(DPR) protocol and is one of the simplest QKD protocols to implement. A single basis is
used to encode the data and to check for an eavesdropper. This is possible by maintaining a
coherent phase amongst all pulses and then modulating the information on the differential
phase between consecutive pulses. On average, each pulse contains less than one photon.
Each photon spreads out over a number of time bins that depends on the temporal coherence
(tc of the source. The probability of a photon being phase coherent with another photon a
time tc away is 1/e (37 %), meaning it is probable that they have no phase relation. The total
wavefunction is therefore the tensor product of all individual time-bin photon states. Bob’s
measurements occur randomly among time bins and tell him the relative phase between a
single pulse and the preceding pulse. This means that to conduct a successful attack, Eve
would have to know Bob’s measurement times in advance. If she makes a random guess at
the measurement time, she will sometimes collapse the wavefunction at the wrong time and
introduce errors in Bob’s measurement.
The main drawback of the DPS protocol is that it is insecure against coherent attacks.
This is where Eve entangles a probe with the entire waveform and stores it in a quantum
memory. When Bob announces his measurement times, Eve can then measure her probe in
the same locations and obtain full knowledge of the key without introducing any errors.
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3.3.1 Theory
A common implementation of the DPS protocol [144, 145, 146] is shown in Fig. 3.1 and the
steps taken by Alice and Bob are:
1. Alice prepares a random string of bits to encode onto weak coherent pulses, where 0
indicates no phase modulation and 1 indicates a π phase modulation.
2. Alice attenuates her signal so the average photon number per pulse is around 0.2 and
then transmits the photons through the quantum channel to Bob.
3. Bob uses a one-bit time delay interferometer to interfere consecutive pulses and
measures the result using SPDs at both interferometer outputs. If his interferometer is
aligned in the same basis as Alice’s encoding basis, the SPD that clicks indicates the
bit value. He records the time and value for each measurement.
4. Bob communicates his timing information to Alice, but not which detector clicked,
allowing them to perform error estimation, error correction and privacy amplification.
Fig. 3.1 Differential phase shift schematic. One method of implementing the DPS protocol
uses a coherent pulse source (for example a carved CW laser) and a phase modulator, PM, to
encode the relative phase, φi, between pulses. After travelling through the quantum channel,
Bob’s receiver is a passive interferometer measuring signals in a single basis.
Many DV protocols use two bases, leading to a sifting loss when the users choose
mismatched bases. This loss is not present in the DPS protocol, meaning that all detected
photons will give a raw key bit. Another advantage over DV protocols is that just two single
photon detectors are required.












where pclick is the probability of Bob’s detector clicking, µ is the mean photon number




The DPS protocol is the simplest protocol to implement using direct modulation because
it uses just a single basis and no phase randomness is required. The principle behind the
phase modulation with no intensity or frequency modulation was described in Section 1.3.4.
Modulations are applied to the phase preparation laser when a π phase shift is required, and
the signal is kept constant when there is no phase shift. The phase preparation laser is driven
with a high DC bias, meaning the visibility is high because the ratio of stimulated emission
to spontaneous emission is also high. The pulse preparation laser is biased just under its
lasing threshold and a 3.3 V AC square wave is applied to gain switch the laser. The phase
preparation laser is injected into the pulse preparation laser via a circulator, transferring the
high visibility to the output, giving phase-modulated pulses with a low QBER.
On the receiver side, a PLC AMZI with a time delay of 500 ps on one arm is used
to interfere consecutive bits. A heater on one arm tunes the measurement basis and a
temperature controller over the entire device ensures it remains stable. The stability of both
the transmitter and receiver ensure that once a basis is set, it requires no stabilisation for the
entire experimental period.
An example of the electrical pattern applied to the phase preparation laser and its subse-
quent output is shown in Figure 3.2a,b). The output after injection is given in Figure 3.2c),
showing no variation in the output intensity due to the modulations. The AMZI output is
given in Figures 3.2d,e), where the different colour corresponds to a different output arm,
and therefore a different bit value.
The protocol was initially carried out using a binary electrical signal, with either a
constant positive or negative π phase shift applied, as shown in the upper trace of Fig. 3.2a).
In QKD systems Alice’s pattern has to be completely random, meaning that a sequence of
many repeated ‘0’ bits, ‘1’ bits or alternating ‘0-1’ bits are equally likely. The mean DC value
is completely different for each of these cases, which creates a problem because the phase
shifts for the same modulation size changes throughout the pattern. This effect is observed
in Fig. 3.3a, where a drop in the average DC of the pattern creates changes in the measured
intensity after the AMZI. All of these changes reduce the visibility, thereby reducing the
secure key rate.
The input pattern should be altered to remove any DC shifts in the phase preparation laser,
creating the scenario shown in Fig. 3.3b. It is possible to DC balance a pattern in classical
communications across each clock period, for example using Manchester encoding. Here,
each clock is separated into two bins, with one bin being in a high state and the other in a low
state. The information is contained in whether the sequence is high-low or low-high. This
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Fig. 3.2 DPS oscilloscope traces. For cases where the signal is compensated and uncom-
pensated. a) Electrical signal applied to the master laser. b) Optical signal from the master
laser. c) Direct measurement of the optical system output. d) and e) Complementary outputs
from both arms
style is not possible using the directly-modulated transmitter, however the pattern can be DC
balanced across a number of bit periods by alternating the π phase shift sign above and below
0, as demonstrated by the lower trace in Fig. 3.2. If a π phase shift has been encoded, the
next time a π phase shift is required, a −π shift is instead given. This is exactly equivalent
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to encoding a π phase shift, however has the effect that the mean DC value for a sequence
of repeated ‘0’ bits is identical to that of a sequence of repeated ‘1’ bits. The compensation
reduces the QBER observed on the oscilloscope from 3.84 % to 1.72 %.
(a) Without compensation. (b) With compensation.
Fig. 3.3 DPS DC Compensation. The rolling average of pseudorandom 210-bit patterns
(top), with the measured intensity of every decoded pulse (bottom).
In order to find the correct modulation amplitude, a random DPS pattern is input to
the system and the pulse intensity is measured as the AMZI phase is varied, as shown in
Fig. 3.4. This gives two sinusoidal curves, with a phase difference dictated by the modulation
amplitude. The correct amplitude for the modulations is equal to the one that gives the
best QBER because it is when the bits are maximally separated. This is the case in the
aforementioned figure, which also shows the two curves crossing at an average intensity of
one half.
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Fig. 3.4 DPS bit intensity with AMZI phase. The peak intensity of the pulses is recorded
by an oscilloscope as the AMZI is tuned about 3π .
3.3.3 Results and discussion
The experimental key rates derived using Eq. 3.1 and implemented using the directly-
modulated quantum transmitter are shown in Fig. 3.5. The QBER and secure key rates follow
the theoretical curves well, with a drop off around 50 dB as the QBER rises above 4 %. The
base QBER used in the simulation is 1.70 %.
The DPS protocol has been implemented by many groups in different variations. One
example is the experiment by Shibata et al. [148] that demonstrated a positive secure key
rate over a 72 dB channel. Their implementation uses an intensity modulator to carve pulses
from a CW laser at 1 GHz and a phase modulator to encode the bits. The aim of this work
is to achieve a secure key rate over long distances, hence the detectors are optimised for
ultra-low dark count rates (0.01 Hz), thus giving them a low efficiency (2.2 %), meaning
the secure key rates are low (around 10 kbps at 20 dB channel loss). The transmitter is
able to achieve a QBER of 1.02 %, meaning the system would potentially outperform the
directly-modulated transmitter, at the expense of increased complexity. The protocol has also
been demonstrated using an actively mode-locked fibre laser at 10 GHz as the pulse source,
with a phase modulator used for encoding [149]. Although the clock rate is five times higher
than the one used in this experiment, they are unable to produce a secure key due to the high
QBER of 9.7 % caused by intersymbol interference.
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Fig. 3.5 Experimental DPS results. Key rates and QBERs extracted using a transmitted
mean photon number of 0.18 photons per pulse.
3.4 Differential quadrature phase shift and BB84
Most experimental physicists would agree that it will remain impossible for Eve to perform
coherent attacks in the foreseeable future, however one of the fundamental ideas behind
QKD is that it should be future-proof. In that regard, it is wrong to ignore coherent attacks in
security analyses. For this reason, theoreticians have worked on how to bolster the security
of DPR protocols to the level of DV protocols such as BB84.
One potential method is known as round-robin DPS [150, 151]. Here, Bob uses an
interferometer with multiple delays (the more he uses, the higher the secure key rate). He
can choose which pulses to interfere, meaning Eve introduces errors when she guesses which
pulses to interfere. Whilst a number of groups have come up with innovative implementa-
tions [152, 153, 154, 155], the receiver remains very impractical and the secure key rates are
low.
Another method is known as the differential quadrature phase shift (DQPS) protocol.
Here, the coherent signal is broken up into blocks with a globally random phase, allowing
a modified BB84 protocol security analysis to be used. Two bases are used, X and Y,
corresponding to the data basis and check basis. In the BB84 protocol, a signal and reference
pulse are transmitted through the fibre with a globally random phase for the pair. This
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block of two pulses has a mean photon number less than one, so the probability of multiple
photons in the total block is very small. In the DQPS protocol, there are a number of signal
and reference pulses in a coherent train, with a globally random phase for the entire block.
Similarly to the BB84 protocol, the probability of any pulse pair having multiple photons is
made very small when setting the mean photon number.
The BB84 protocol can be implemented using a phase-randomised pulse source and an
AMZI, as shown in Fig. 3.6. This separates a single pulse into two time bins, modulating
the phase between the two of them and allowing demodulation with an identical AMZI.
The difficulty with this is that thermal fluctuations can create changes to the interferometer
delay lengths. Feedback can be used to counteract this effect. To implement this feedback,
stabilisation pulses are sent with the quantum signals, allowing the delay lengths to be
continually measured and equalised. Another option would be to use a PLC AMZI (see
Section 1.3.5), which are more stable. This is difficult in the transmitter, however, because
high-speed PLC AMZIs are not commonly available and the commercially available devices
use a heater to select the phase basis, limiting them to kHz speeds.
Fig. 3.6 Potential BB84 transmitter. A phase-randomised pulse source sends pulses into an
AMZI with a phase modulator (PM) on one arm. This produces pulse pairs with a globally
random phase and a differential phase between the pair (φ1, φ2).
The DQPS protocol, however, is more difficult to implement. An interferometer-based
approach would require a multi-delay interferometer in the transmitter, a device that would
be highly unstable and impractical. Another approach would be to use a standard DPS
transmitter, then have an extra phase modulator to randomise the phase of blocks, as shown
in Fig. 3.7. Whilst attractive in theory, this would require a high-speed source of perfectly
random numbers and infinitely precise electrical modulation signals. For this reason, the
DQPS protocol has not yet been experimentally demonstrated.
To allow a fair comparison between protocols, the same security analysis is applied to
the BB84 and DQPS protocols in this chapter. Chapter 5 will look at the more efficient and
secure decoy-state BB84 with a finite-key-size analysis.
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Fig. 3.7 A Potential differential quadrature phase shift transmitter. An extra random
number generator (RNG) is fed into the phase modulator (PM) to provide the random phases
for blocks in the differential quadrature phase shift protocol.
3.4.1 Theory
The steps to carrying out the DQPS protocol are outlined by Kawakami et al. and provided
here for clarity [156]:
1. Alice chooses a random basis for each block of L pulses Ab ∈ {0,1} with probabilities
p0 and p1.
2. Inside each block, she randomly chooses bit values Al ∈ {0,1}. The state can be












3. Each block is given a random phase and sent to Bob.
4. Bob uses an AMZI with a one-bit time delay for phase measurement in a random basis
for each block Bb ∈ {0,π/2}, again with probabilities p0 and p1.
5. Bob records when he measured clicks and what their outcomes are. After detecting a
click, he ignores any further clicks inside that block. If both detectors click at the same
time, he randomly assigns a bit value.
6. Bob communicates his measurement times to Alice, allowing them to share a sifted
key and then to perform error correction and privacy amplification.
The steps for BB84 are identical, but the block size is set to a constant L=2.
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The security analysis uses a concept known as tagging, where all the qubits that Eve
has full knowledge of are ‘tagged’. It is assumed that all multi-photon pulses are ‘tagged’
and are thus removed from the final key. This parameter can be measured in principle by
Alice performing a projective measurement of the total photon number in a pair. The tagging
technique must be modified slightly to work with the DQPS protocol, because a pulse-pair is
defined only after Bob performs his measurement, whereas in BB84 it is always clear because
only one pulse-pair exists. This parameter is now the probability of a single block having
two or more photons distributed in a single pulse, or in two adjacent pulses. It is too late for
Alice to make this photon measurement by the time Bob has performed his measurement,
thus the security proof assumes Alice stores auxiliary qubits to perform a photon number
measurement when she knows Bob’s measurement time. In reality, the tagged photon rate









where the fraction term is simply the binomial coefficient (L+1−mm ).


















where p0 is the probability of Alice preparing a state in the data basis, Q is the total gain
and EX ,Y are the errors in the data and check basis respectively. h(x) is the binary entropy
function truncated to unity at input values over 0.5.
3.4.2 Implementation
A 2 GHz electrical square wave is applied to the pulse preparation laser for the DQPS and
BB84 protocols, as with the DPS protocol, because no intensity encoding is necessary. The
phase preparation laser signal must be modified from the DPS implementation, however,
because phase randomisation is required. This can be implemented by driving the laser below
threshold for a period of time, as described in Section 1.3.6. Below threshold, spontaneous
emission is dominant, meaning that when the laser is driven above threshold, the starting
phase is completely random and uncorrelated to any previous coherence.
A high bandwidth master laser is required to respond to the large swing of the phase-
randomisation signal, whilst accurately providing the shallow phase modulations. A 2 GHz
60 Phase-modulated QKD
master laser, for example, is unable to respond quickly enough to provide both, as shown
in Fig. 3.8. This figure also shows that a 10 GHz master laser is able to faithfully produce
the desired signals. The peak shown at the beginning of each pulse-pair period is due to the
transient oscillations caused by the laser rapidly coming from below to above threshold. This
produces oscillations that have a characteristic decay time. These transient oscillations can
be seen to continue until the phase modulation pulse, meaning the first pulse of the pulse pair
could have a different frequency and intensity to the second pulse. These oscillations could be
minimised by using a higher bandwidth laser, although telecommunication wavelength lasers
are not commercially available at much higher bandwidths than the one used. To combat this,
the phase-randomisation down-time is reduced to 125 ps, ensuring these oscillations are not
present when the first pulse is locked.
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Fig. 3.8 BB84 master laser optical outputs. Measured optical waveforms for a 2 GHz (top)
and 10 GHz (bottom) master laser, with a pseudorandom BB84 pattern input. The down-time
is 250 ps.
A 29-bit pseudorandom pattern is generated as Alice’s key using Labview. This is used
for all distances, even though the block length changes with distance, hence the block size is
limited to L = 2n +1, where 2 ≤ n ≤ 512. This is shown in Fig. 3.9. A Matlab simulation
using Eq. 3.5, the base QBER due to phase encoding and detector efficiency enables the
calculation of the optimal block size and mean photon number at each distance. A 512/n bit
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pseudorandom pattern is generated to decide the encoding basis for each block based on the
probability of sending a ‘data’ and ‘check’ block. L is defined such that the first pulse will
always be a reference pulse, so there are L-1 useful time bins within the block. The phase
preparation laser is then patterned to encode the pulses with the desired phase shifts.
Fig. 3.9 DQPS blocks. Two example blocks for the DQPS protocol, with a block size L=5.
This first pulse in all blocks is a reference pulse, hence only 8 useful bits are shown in the
figure.
Once encoded, the output is sent through a polarisation controller to align it with the
polariser in Bob’s AMZI. After this, the light passes through a spectral filter before attenuation
with a variable optical attenuator to the desired mean photon number. For the majority of
measurements, a second variable optical attenuator is used here to simulate the quantum
channel attenuation. Data points at 20, 40 and 60 km are implemented with real optical fibre
with a loss rate of 0.2 dB/km.
In this experiment, the AMZI loss is measured at 3 dB and the SNSPDs are measured
with a total efficiency of 38.6 % and a dark count rate of 15 Hz. This analysis is purely about
the transmitter, so no finite-key-size analysis is carried out, however to minimise the effect of
any statistical fluctuations in the gain and QBER, measurements are carried out separately in
each basis until 4×105 counts are detected in each basis. At the largest channel attenuation,
22 dB, 600 s of acquisition time is required to obtain this block size.
The evolution of bit intensity with AMZI phase is given in Fig. 3.11. This shows the
four encoded phases, each separated by π/2, as well as the random pulses. The random
interferences have a constant value around 0.5 because the oscilloscope signal is averaged.
The low QBER of the X and Y bases can also be inferred from this, as the extinction ratio of
the states within each basis is high.
The probability of having a click in each time slot is simply the number of measured
clicks divided by the laser repetition rate, Pclick = n/nrep. This allows us to define Q as the
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Fig. 3.10 Differential quadrature phase shift schematic. Blocks of size L=3 are injected
into the slave laser via a circulator in this figure. At practical system efficiencies, the optimal
block length used is longer than this. Bob’s measurement values are shown along their
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Fig. 3.11 DQPS bit intensity with AMZI phase. The peak intensity of the pulses is recorded
by an oscilloscope as the AMZI is tuned about 2π .
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probability of having a single click in a block.
Q = 1− (1−Pclick)L−1. (3.6)
As described previously, if Bob measures a click for multiple pulses within the block, he only
records the first one. This is used alongside the measured QBERs in the X and Y bases to
calculate the secure key rate. The X (Y) QBER is measured indirectly through the visibility
in the output histogram when the AMZI is set to measure in the X (Y) basis.
3.4.3 Results and discussion
The measured QBERs at different channel attenuations for the BB84 and DQPS protocols
are shown in Fig. 3.12. This follows the expected trend, with an increase in QBER at larger
attenuations due to the increased influence of dark counts. The base QBER for both protocols
is low, at around 2.15 %. This base QBER is due to the visibility of the light source, as
shown by Equation 1.3. This is slightly higher than the QBER observed in the DPS protocol
due to the phase randomisation pulses disturbing the signal. The protocols would have the
same QBER if more accurate electronics were used and the laser had a higher bandwidth.
The measured key rates are shown as a function of channel attenuation in Fig. 3.13. The
raw counts shown are used alongside Eq. 3.5, Eq. 3.6 and the measured QBERs to calculate
the secure key rate. Megabit per second secure key rates are achieved for both protocols at
short distances. Using this transmitter, it would be possible to distil secure keys up to 22 dB
in both protocols, which is equivalent to 110 km of standard optical fibre (with a loss rate of
0.2 dB/km).
Alongside the results for a variable optical attenuator as the quantum channel, three
measurements are taken with real optical fibre, at distances of 20, 40 and 60 km. These
all have a small amount of insertion loss, leading to their slight displacements from 4, 8
and 12 dB attenuation respectively. Group velocity dispersion, where different frequency
components of light travel with different velocities, becomes an issue at longer distances.
A pulse with a spectral width of 12 GHz would be broadened by 100 ps after 60 km of
real optical fibre (based on a dispersion parameter of 18 ps/(nm km)). This would lead to
an increased QBER, so dispersion compensated fibre is used. This introduces a negative
dispersion along the fibre, reversing the broadening dispersion effects.
Another effect observed in real optical fibres is polarisation drift. Although phase
encoding is used in this experiment, the detectors are polarisation dependent, and a polariser
is placed after the AMZI. This means that polarisation feedback would be required in
64 Phase-modulated QKD






6  B B 8 4
 D Q P S





A t t e n u a t i o n  ( d B )
Fig. 3.12 DQPS and BB84 error rates. Measured QBERs at all experimental distances
(symbols) shown alongside the simulated values (lines) based on the mean photon number
used and the dark count rate.
deployed fibre to correct for any drifts along the fibre. In the current experiment, the fibre is
in a laboratory so polarisation drift is not observed during the experiment.
The optimal DQPS block size increases with distance, starting at L=17 for an attenuation
of 1.8 dB, rising to L=129 at an attenuation of 12 dB. These values are calculated at all
attenuations using the key rate simulation with the measured system efficiency and base
QBER. The secure key rate has an L−1 term, so intuitively it looks like a larger block size
would be prohibitive. This term is counteracted by the terms Q and rtag, which are both
dependent on L. For a fixed mean photon number, Q will be higher for a larger block size
because there are more potential time bins for a photon to be detected in. The tagging
probability will also be higher for a larger block size for the same reason. This trade off
between L, Q and rtag also explains why the DQPS secure key rate is higher than that of the
BB84 protocol at all distances, with an average improvement of 2.71 times.
The optimal mean photon number, µ , is also calculated for each distance using the key
rate simulation. After being set, the actual values are measured, and are shown in Fig. 3.14.
µ decreases with attenuation due to Eve’s improved ability to mask her measurements as
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Fig. 3.13 DQPS and BB84 key rates. Secure key rates shown alongside the raw count rates
for each protocol. Experimental data is given by symbols and simulated data based on the
mean photon number are represented by lines. The DQPS block sizes, L, are also given.
noise by replacing the quantum channel with a completely lossless one. This would allow
her to obtain more information from a photon number splitting attack.
The lack of an interferometer in Alice and the PLC AMZI used in Bob allow a demon-
stration of the excellent stability of the transmitter. To do this, the system is aligned once
and then left to run. The lasers and AMZI are independently temperature controlled using a
thermoelectric cooler with no active feedback. The single photon counts and QBER are then
measured every 10 seconds with an integration time of 5 seconds over a period of three days.
The results are given in Fig. 3.15. This shows an average QBER of 2.03 % and an average
secure key rate of 171.27 ± 2.65 kbps. There are no drops in secure key transfer over 72
hours, and the QBER does not rise above 3 % at any stage, even though the system is kept
in a thermally unstable laboratory. The reductions in the raw key rate observed at various
points are caused by errors in the single photon counting hardware. In a real-world system,
this would allow 4.95 Gbits of secure key material to be shared between two users separated
by 40 km of standard optical fibre. This demonstration reduces the system complexity by
removing the need for time consuming stabilisation routines.
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Fig. 3.14 DQPS and BB84 mean photon numbers. The optimum mean photon number for
each protocol at different channel attenuations.
Whilst the QBER demonstrated in this BB84 implementation is comparable to that shown
in other implementations, at around 2.5-5% [99, 101, 157], it is difficult to compare the
secure key rates against other implementations. This is because an improved form of BB84,
known as decoy-state BB84, allows for higher secure key rates over long distances, thus
all experimental demonstrations since 2005 use decoy states. The decoy-state technique
allows for a better estimation of the amount of single photons received by Bob, compared
to the worst-case analysis given in this chapter. Developments in single photon detection
technology since 2005 mean that the demonstration of BB84 in this chapter produces
secure key rates orders of magnitude higher than those achieved a decade ago in other
non-decoy-state demonstrations. The decoy-state technique and its implementation with
the directly-modulated transmitter will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5, allowing for a
comparison with more current implementations.
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Fig. 3.15 DQPS stability. The key rates and QBER for a continuous DQPS measurement at
8 dB channel attenuation with no active feedback.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has shown the implementation of three phase-modulated QKD protocols with
the directly-modulated quantum transmitter: the DPS, BB84 and DQPS protocols. The
same transmitter hardware is used in all experiments, with changes to the driving signals
enabling the different protocols. The QBERs demonstrated in the DPS and BB84 protocols
are comparable to those found in many other implementations. This is the first experimental
demonstration of the DQPS protocol. This protocol would ordinarily require a complicated
transmitter, with either a multi-armed interferometer or the active phase-randomisation of
every block. It was shown that the DQPS protocol is able to achieve a 2.71 times higher secure
key rate to the BB84 protocol. This highlights the strong potential of the DQPS protocol,
especially because implementing it with the directly-modulated quantum transmitter is just
as simple as implementing the BB84 protocol.
The importance of compensating the electrical signal into the phase-preparation laser is
shown. If this is not done correctly, the phase modulation is dependent on the mean DC level
in each pattern region. For all protocols this can be done by alternating the sign of the π
modulation pulse.
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The stability of the transmitter is also demonstrated with 72 hours of continuous operation
while implementing the DQPS protocol with a channel attenuation of 8 dB. The low QBER





This chapter looks at intensity modulation in classical communications and then outlines
how it can be used for quantum communications in the form of time-bin encoding. The
prominent QKD protocol that uses intensity encoding to share a secret key between two
users, the coherent one way (COW) protocol, is then introduced and described. Finally,
this protocol is implemented with the directly-modulated quantum transmitter described in
previous chapters.
4.2 Intensity encoding
Intensity modulation is an obvious solution for encoding information using light. Even
before fibre-optic communication, signal lamps and Morse code enabled long-distance
communication between ships. Intensity modulation is not only easy to perform at the
transmitter side, it is also simple at the receiver side because direct detection can be used.
In classical communications, amplitude-shift keying (ASK) is a common method of
encoding data. This uses intensity modulation of a high-frequency sinusoidal wave (the
carrier wave). Multiple bits of information can be encoded per pulse, with M intensity levels
giving log2(M) bits of information. One form of ASK is on-off keying, where the carrier
wave is either on or off for each bit-period. Pulse amplitude modulation is a similar method
that uses a pulse-train instead of the carrier wave. These pulses are then independently
modulated in the same manner as ASK and their amplitude encodes the information.
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Practically, direct laser modulation is simpler and cheaper than using external modulators
to encode data in the intensity of light. Unfortunately, it suffers a number of drawbacks in
classical communication systems. The main drawback is that the modulation bandwidth
is lower than that possible with external modulators. Along with this, the chirp caused
by simultaneous wavelength modulation leads to complications with dispersion. These
properties mean that high-speed intensity modulators are most regularly produced using an
AMZI architecture. Here, input light is split into two paths and a phase-modulator (commonly
Lithium Niobate) placed in one path changes the phase of the light, modulating the light
intensity as the recombining waves interfere. In this manner, it is possible to precisely control
the output intensity of light.
4.3 Time-bin encoding
BB84 uses qubits in orthonormal states within any conjugate bases. Eve has to guess a basis
to measure the qubit because she does not know in advance which basis Bob has chosen
to perform his measurement in. When she chooses the incorrect basis, the result will be
non-deterministic due to the use of conjugate bases.
Whilst polarisation-encoded qubits could be used, they are prone to depolarisation and
polarisation mode dispersion. This requires continuous high-frequency stabilisation to
compensate for. Time-bin qubits are far more practical for fibre-based QKD applications.
These take the form
|ψ⟩= α |0⟩+ eiφ β |1⟩ , (4.1)
where α2 +β 2 = 1. There are two potential time bins, early and late, denoted by |0⟩ and |1⟩
respectively, with a phase difference between the two defined by φ . This means the effective
transmitted logical bit rate is half that of the clock rate. Three conjugate bases can therefore
be used, as shown in Fig. 4.1. The X and Y bases have been described and used in Chapter 3.











the Y basis. The global phase of each time-bin qubit must be completely random to ensure
the security of BB84 and other similar DV QKD protocols.
Equally, the Z, or polar, basis can be used. Here, α = 1 and β = 0 or α = 0 and β = 1,
meaning the photon is either in the early or late time bin, with no phase encoding within
the qubit. It is simple to show that the states within the basis are orthonormal and that a
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measurement in the X or Y basis when encoding in the Z basis will give a non-deterministic
outcome. Practically, the polar basis requires intensity modulation and no phase modulation.
Fig. 4.1 QKD states on the Bloch sphere. The three potential QKD bases (X, Y and Z) are
shown, with their states represented by arrows. φ gives the phase encoding between the two
pulses.
The Z-basis also has a number of benefits when used in QKD. Firstly, the QBER can be
lower than with phase-encoding techniques due to high extinction-ratio intensity modulators
and a receiver that is limited only by dark counts rather than interferometer visibility. This
means that fewer bits are lost to error correction, increasing the secure key rate. Also, the
receiver for the Z-basis is simple, using direct-detection, as in classical communications.
SPDs are the most expensive part of a QKD system, and direct detection requires just a
single SPD, compared to two with phase encoding. The main drawback is that the system
complexity is increased if encoding in the X or Y bases is also required. This means that
a phase modulator can be required as well as an intensity modulator. BB84 can in fact be
carried out with two states in the Z basis, and just one in the phase basis [158].
The analysis above described the qubits as used for DV protocols such as BB84, however
these bases can also be used for DPR protocols. Here, the pulse pair is not phase randomised,
meaning the photon wavefunction is spread across a number of time bins. Security relies
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on the maintained coherence in one of the phase bases and the qubit is defined as a tensor
product across the time bins.
4.4 Coherent one way QKD
4.4.1 Theory
The COW protocol is a DPR protocol that exploits the Z basis, with the X basis being used
occasionally to ensure the coherence has not been broken by an eavesdropper. The protocol
is so-called because the phase between all photons is coherent, and the quantum signal travels
only from Alice to Bob. Also, this protocol does not require equalisation of the Z and X
basis mean photon number, which is required by three-state BB84 [158], simplifying the
experimental implementation. The COW protocol has been used to distribute a secure key
between two parties separated by 307 km of fibre, which was, until very recently, the longest
distance for any two party protocol [86]. This is possible because the QBER can be made
low in the Z basis, and also partially because the protocol has a weaker security than, for
example, the decoy state BB84 protocol. As with the other main DPR protocol, differential
phase shift QKD, the COW protocol has a simple implementation. This is shown in Fig. 4.2
and the steps are:
1. Alice randomly chooses which state to send from |β0⟩ = |α⟩ |0⟩, |β1⟩ = |0⟩ |α⟩ and
|D⟩= |α⟩ |α⟩, where |α⟩ represents a coherent state of light with mean photon number
µ = |α|2 and |0⟩ is an empty, or ‘vacuum’ state. |β0⟩ and |β1⟩ are the logical bits,
which she chooses with probabilities Pβ0 = Pβ1 =
1−PD
2 , where |D⟩ is the decoy state.
2. Bob uses a 90:10 beamsplitter to passively route the majority of photons directly to an
SPD, where he can measure the bit value. The remaining 10% of the photons are sent
to an AMZI fixed in the X basis, allowing Bob to check the coherence. This ratio can
be varied, however 90:10 gives a good trade-off between receiving a high number of
photons for the key, whilst still receiving sufficient photons to measure the security.
3. Bob communicates his timing information to Alice and Alice tells Bob when she sent
decoy states, allowing them to perform error estimation, error correction and privacy
amplification.
Whilst the decoy states do reduce the secure key rate because fewer logical bits are
transmitted, they are necessary because they allow the inter-bit interference to be measured.
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Fig. 4.2 Potential COW implementation. This uses a coherent pulse source (for example a
carved CW laser) and an intensity modulator, IM, to encode the bit value.
Without the decoy states, the coherence can only be measured through the intra-bit sequence
|β1⟩ |β0⟩. This stops an attack by Eve where she coherently measures pulse pairs because she
will have to choose between breaking the coherence in a logical bit or between two logical
bits, decreasing the visibility if she chooses incorrectly. Eve doesn’t know where the decoy
pulses have been sent, thus she will inadvertently reduce the visibility. The decoy states also
have the benefit of minimising the finite-key-size effect, because more pulses can be used to
measure the visibility.
Korzh et al [86] outlines a finite-key-size analysis to derive the secure key rates against

















which can be divided by the time required to obtain the block to calculate the secure key rate.
This equation can be broken into a number of parts. The first term is the key length after
correcting for Eve’s information, which is a function of measured block size in the Z basis
(nZ), QBER (Q) and visibility (V ). Here,
ζ = (2V −1)× exp(−µ)−2
√
[1− exp(−2µ)]V (1−V ). (4.3)
h(x) is the binary entropy function truncated to unity for x ≥ 0.5. The second term is the
reduction in key length after error correction using an algorithm with an efficiency fEC. The
final terms are the finite-key-size correction terms and β is chosen to maximise L, constrained
by β ∈ (0,εqkd/4). εcor is the probability that Alice and Bob do not share identical keys after
the exchange.
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Finite-key-size fluctuations are also taken into account in V, which deviates from the
observed visibility by a term ∆ (i.e. V =Vobserved −∆):
∆ =


























and λ = 0.5(1−Vobserved). This is a tail inequality, which essentially allows us to quantify a
lower bound on the visibility. nX is the measured block size in the X basis.
4.4.2 Implementation
In order to perform the COW protocol with the directly-modulated light source, care must
be taken to ensure the phase difference between the output pulses remains constant. If the
phase preparation laser was removed from the system, it would still be possible to encode
data in the Z basis by patterning the pulse preparation laser. This, however, would produce
phase-randomised pulses, thus giving a random measurement result in the X basis. In order
to provide a coherent phase, CW light from the phase preparation laser is injected into the
pulse preparation laser. The visibility in the X basis is defined by the coherence of the phase
preparation laser and the quality of the phase inheritance. The Z basis can then be encoded
by patterning the pulse preparation laser.
The basic transmitter and receiver are shown in Fig. 4.3. A precise wavelength-tuneable
CW fibre laser is used as the phase preparation laser for this demonstration, allowing the
visibility to be maximised. A wavelength filter at the output port of the circulator removes
any spurious noise, then an optical attenuator attenuates the signal to µ = 0.1 photons per
pulse at Alice before being sent through the quantum channel to Bob. As with the DPS
protocol, the receiver is passive and requires only two SPDs. This is possible because the
AMZI can be tuned to measure in the X basis, such that SPD2 is placed at the destructive
output port. The visibility can then be calculated using the interfering peaks (NI) (i.e. a
pulse-pulse sequence) and the fact that the non-interfering (NNI) (i.e. a pulse-vacuum or
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The other detector directly measures the logical bits in the Z basis.
Fig. 4.3 COW schematic. A CW master laser is injected into a pattered gain-switched
slave laser. Not shown are the filter and optical attenuator. This is then attenuated to the
single photon level before being sent through the quantum channel to Bob. SPD1 detects the
time-bin encoded photons, and SPD2 measures their visibility using a one bit asymmetric
Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI). The pattern shown in this figure is |β0⟩, |β1⟩, |D⟩,
|β1⟩.
The evolution of the intensity of the different interferences in SPD2 with MZI phase
is shown in Fig. 4.4. This shows that the intensity of the non-interfering pulses remains
constant, whereas the interfering pulse intensity varies as the measurement basis is rotated.
Patterning effects, where the intensity of a pulse is correlated with the intensity of the
previous pulse, become a problem when working with intensity-modulated QKD systems.
The COW security analysis is based on Eve obtaining a well-defined amount of information
every time she makes a measurement on a qubit in the quantum channel. This amount
of information changes if there is a patterning effect, because Eve could potentially gain
information on the previous pulse. This requires either a change to the security analysis,
which reduces the secure key rate, or preferably the removal of the patterning effect.
Patterning effects can be removed when working with an external intensity modulator
by setting the DC bias to maximum transmission and then any modulation pulses are driven
at the half-wave voltage. The transmission follows a sinusoidal relationship with applied
voltage, so this modulation format works at the peak and trough of the transmission. Any
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Fig. 4.4 Bit intensity with AMZI phase. The intensity of every bit after the AMZI is
measured on an oscilloscope as the measurement basis is rotated about 2π .
deviations in the applied electrical signal will thus have a minimal influence on the output
voltage. This effect is further described in Section 5.4.2.
The issue must be tackled in a different manner for the directly-modulated transmitter.
The finite electrical bandwidth of the system means that an electrical pulse after a vacuum
pulse will have a lower voltage than an electrical pulse after another electrical pulse. In order
to remove this problem, a finite electrical pulse is placed in every time bin. When a signal
pulse is required, the electrical pulse is above threshold, whereas it is below threshold when
a vacuum pulse is required. This ensures that each signal pulse is stimulated by the same
electrical signal and there are no patterning effects. Before this compensation, the patterning
effect can be as high as 5 %, however this is greatly reduced to 0.3 % with compensation, as
shown in Table 4.1
Table 4.1 Direct patterning effects. The signal (‘s’) pulse intensities extracted from a 29-bit
pseudorandom pattern input to the pulse preparation laser proceeding either another signal
or a vacuum (‘w’) state. The average ‘s’ pulse intensity is normalized to unity.
Pattern Average intensity of second pulse Deviation from average (%)
s→s 1.000±0.017 0.00
w→s 1.003±0.023 0.30
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A pseudorandom 29-bit pattern is generated with a decoy pulse probability of 1 % and
equal probability of logical bit values. The corresponding electrical pattern is then input to
the slave laser, to produce 61.5 ps pulses at 2 GHz. A high extinction ratio of 29.4 dB is
achieved between empty and non-empty pulses, leading to a low Z basis encoding error.
A variable attenuator acts to simulate the quantum channel loss, after which a beamsplitter
directs 90% of the pulses to the Z basis and 10% to the X basis measurement. A heater in
one arm of the AMZI is used to select the X basis and ensure that destructive interference
occurs at the SPD. Superconducting nanowire SPDs are used, with a dark count rate of 10 Hz
and an efficiency of 34 % at a wavelength of 1550 nm. A digitiser with 100 ps time bins
logs the time of arrival of the pulses into 1024 separate bins to create Z and X measurement
histograms for extraction of visibility, QBER and count rates.
4.4.3 Simulation
High count rates at short distances when using direct detection make it necessary to account
for jitter when simulating the key rates. Although the signal time jitter is negligible due to
the optical injection locking, jitter from the detectors is an issue. Detector jitter, the variation
in determination of photon arrival time, is caused by the electronic circuitry and intrinsic
effects inside the SNSPD active material. The electronic effect is caused by noise in the
various components, such as amplifiers, which is well-characterised and can be minimised
by manufacturers. It can also be caused by the electrical signal not being completely
extinguished before a following pulse, leading to the following pulse being registered early.
This would lead to a relationship between jitter and count rate. Very limited research has
been done into the cause and conditions for these intrinsic effects [91], however it is also
possible that they originate from the detector geometry [159]. After a photon impinges on the
superconducting nanowire, the time taken for an electrical response to reach the electronics
depends on the location of the event on the nanowire.
During SNSPD characterisation, a linear relationship between jitter, J, in seconds and
count rate, C, in counts per second was observed, following
J = 3.595×10−18C+5.871×10−11, (4.7)
with an r-square value of 0.998. This means that the jitter is around 95 ps at count rates
of 10 MHz, compared to 59 ps at count rates around 100 kHz. This increased jitter causes
the measured QBER to increase at short distances, where the count rate is high, due to
intersymbol interference. Pulses that belong in one time bin will be measured in the next
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time bin. If the time bin is supposed to be a vacuum state, any extra photons will reduce
the interference contrast, thus making the visibility and QBER worse. This extra jitter also
means that more time bins must be collected at short distances in order to measure all the
counts, further reducing the interference contrast.
The error rate simulations incorporate jitter by modelling its effect as a Gaussian dis-







It is then assumed that each pulse is in the centre of its bin, allowing the proportion of the
signal entering the next bin, Ileak, to be calculated using the cumulative density function of a
normal distribution with standard deviation Jtot .
4.4.4 Results and discussion
An example of the measurement results for the COW protocol is shown in Fig. 4.5. This
shows both logical bits, alongside a single decoy pulse sequence. The top panel highlights
the high interference contrast between signal and vacuum pulses that give such a low QBER
in the Z basis. The bottom and middle panel show that consecutive pulse sequences will give
interference, and also show that this interference contrast is not as high quality as in the Z
basis. It can also be seen that the area under the constructively interfering pulses is four times
higher than under non-interfering pulses. This is why the constructive interference shown in
the bottom panel does not need to be measured in the experiment. It should be noted that the
count-rate dependence on jitter is also present in this figure, with the pulses appearing more
spread out in the top panel compared to the bottom two panels.
The measured QBER and visibility are shown along with the simulated values in Fig. 4.6.
The experimental QBER follows the simulated trend due to jitter, where at short distances
the count rate of around 10 MHz increases the jitter, and consequently the QBER. At short
distances, it was necessary to consider a larger bin width experimentally, in order to detect
all the expected counts. The simulation does not account for the difference in bin width,
hence the fit is not perfect. The visibility is relatively unaffected by the increased jitter at
short distances. This is because the count rate is lower in the X basis than the Z basis due to
the 90:10 beamsplitting ratio and also the losses caused by the AMZI. Due to this, however,
dark counts have a much larger impact on the visibility than on the QBER, with a drop-off
observed at 25 dB.
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Fig. 4.5 Measured COW SPD traces. Signals received by bob in a) The Z basis; b) and c)
the destructive and constructive arms of the X basis AMZI. The logical bit pattern shown,
separated by vertical grey lines, is |β0⟩, |β0⟩, |β1⟩, |β2⟩, |β1⟩, |β1⟩, |β0⟩, |β1⟩. The acquisition
time is 60 s, the quantum channel loss is 15 dB and Alice is transmitting 0.1 photons per
pulse.
The protocol is carried out until over 2×107 counts are measured in the Z basis at each
distance. This number of counts is chosen in order to minimise the finite-key-size effect,
which is implemented with a security parameter of εQKD = 10−10. At longer distances, this
requires an exponentially longer acquisition time, with 600 s necessary at 30 dB channel loss.
Histograms, like those in the top and middle panels of Fig. 4.5, are collected, allowing for
the extraction of count rates in both bases, QBERs and visibilities.
The secure and sifted key rates are shown in Fig. 4.7. The sifted key rate is simply
the count rate in the Z basis with all decoy counts removed. The drop off in secure key
rate at 35 dB is due to the decreasing visibility caused by the increasing influence of dark
counts. This means that the finite-key-size effect is not the limiting factor, so increasing
the acquisition time at long distances will not improve the maximum achievable distance.
The key rate at 1.85 dB is lower than the theoretically expected value because a lower mean
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Fig. 4.6 COW error rates. QBERs in the Z basis (top) and visibilities in the X basis (bottom).
Experimental data is represented by symbols and theoretical data by lines. The theoretical
analysis accounts for the increased detector jitter at short distances.
mean photon number here is 0.07 photons per pulse, whereas it is 0.107 photons per pulse at
all other distances. As well as this effect, the detection efficiency is also slightly reduced at
higher count rates, explaining why the experimental points are under the theoretical line.
Whilst finite-key-size fluctuations are accounted for in this demonstration, they have only
a small effect on the secure key rate. This is because the system has a high stability, thus can
be carried out for a long time to minimise statistical variations in the measured counts and
error rates.
Comparing Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the directly-modulated transmitter does not actually
simplify the transmitter for the COW protocol, rather equalling the simplicity of other
implementations. This being the case, it is still important that the transmitter can implement
this protocol, because other implementations would not also be able to adapt to protocols that
require phase-modulation and phase randomisation without changing the hardware. These
results compare favourably to the state-of-the-art COW protocol implementation by Korzh et
al. [86]. Their experiment uses a CW laser with an intensity modulator to carve out the
desired pulses. This allows the researchers to achieve a higher visibility than that achieved in
this thesis, of 98.4 %, compared to 97.5 %. Surprisingly, the QBER demonstrated in their
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Fig. 4.7 COW key rates. Experimental (symbols) and simulated (lines) key rates. The secure
key rate is calculated using a finite-key-size analysis with a block size of at least 2×107 in
the Z basis.
paper is worse than the QBER shown in this thesis, at 1.5 % compared to 0.2 %. The resultant
key rates demonstrated in this thesis are higher than the paper, at 1.08×104 bps compared
to 5.20× 103 bps at 25.7 dB channel attenuation. This is due to the order of magnitude
improvement in the QBER, as well as the higher efficiency detectors (34 % vs 20 %). Also,
they are able to reach a channel attenuation of 51.9 dB with a positive secure key rate, whilst
the demonstration in this thesis reaches only around 35 dB. This is due mainly due their
usage of ultra-low dark count detectors (0.87 Hz) and long detector dead-time, but also due
to their increased key collection time at long distances and the increased visibility.
The key rates are excellent when compared to the demonstrations of the DQPS and
BB84 protocols in Section 3.4. This is especially notable when one notices the comparative
simplicity of the passive receiver for the COW protocol, with just two SPDs. The main
drawback is that the COW protocol has no security against coherent attacks. These require
Eve to have an infinitely long quantum memory and a quantum computer to perform high-
fidelity coherent quantum measurements. Whilst this may never be possible, it is important




This chapter has shown the first implementation of an intensity-modulated QKD protocol
with a directly-modulated quantum transmitter. The transmitter hardware is identical to that
used to implement the DPS, BB84 and DQPS protocols, with simple changes to the driving
signals. Here, the phase preparation laser emits CW light to provide a coherent phase to the
patterned slave laser pulses.
Accounting for finite-key-size effects, kilobit per second secure key rates have been
obtained over a 30 dB quantum channel, limited by detector dark counts and acquisition
time. At short distances, megabit per second key rates have been shown up to attenuations of
10 dB. These results are comparable to state-of-the-art demonstrations of the COW protocol.
Chapter 5
Concurrent phase and intensity
modulated QKD
5.1 Introduction
The concept of separate phase and intensity modulation, alongside phase randomisation, has
been explored in detail in the previous chapters. This chapter will work on bringing these
concepts together to perform a single QKD protocol. It will also introduce the concept of
decoy states and explore two different methods of real-time production of decoy states with
the directly-modulated quantum transmitter.
5.2 Phase and intensity encoding
The idea of phase encoding was introduced in the form of phase-shift keying in Section 3.2,
and intensity encoding in the form of amplitude shift keying in Section 4.2. These two
techniques can be combined in a technique known as quadrature amplitude modulation
(QAM) [160, pp. 160–166]. This uses concurrent amplitude modulation with phase shift
keying to modulate more levels than is possible with the separate techniques, as shown in
Fig. 5.1. Symbols in 256-QAM, for example, contain 8 bits of information, whereas PSK
is limited to around 8 phase levels, containing 3 bits of information [161, 162]. The main
drawback in moving to a higher number of levels is that the symbols become closer together
on the constellation diagram, decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio [160, p. 164].
The two encoding methods can also be used together for QKD, as described in Sec-
tion 4.3 [111, 158, 163]. In this case, the Z basis replaces either the X or Y phase basis. One




Fig. 5.1 Constellation diagrams. Quadrature amplitude vs in phase amplitude for a)
Amplitude shift keying, b) Quadrature phase shift keying and c) 8-quadrature amplitude
modulation. Red circles indicate the modulation levels.
such protocol implementing the Z basis is known as the polar BB84 protocol and is identical
in theory to the phase-encoded BB84 protocol because the security is still based on the use
of conjugate bases [59]. If Eve measures a qubit in the Z basis, she measures which time bin
the photon is in, collapsing the photon wavefunction and destroying the phase information.
Practically, polar BB84 requires a more complex transmitter than phase-encoded BB84.
The intensity of the X/Y basis must be reduced by one half to ensure it contains the same
mean photon number as the Z basis. Also, a vacuum state must be modulated to encode
the Z basis. These two requirements need an intensity modulator to faithfully produce
three intensity levels, on top of the AMZI and phase modulator. The receiver, however
can be simpler for polar BB84 because photons in the Z basis can be measured by direct
detection. A completely passive receiver would require just three SPDs, compared to four in
phase-encoded BB84. This is important because SPDs are usually the most expensive and
complex component in QKD systems. An example receiver is shown in Fig. 5.2. A necessary
requirement for the security of BB84 is that the detection probability is independent of the
chosen basis [84, 164]. To satisfy this, an attenuator is added in the Z basis detection arm to
balance out the loss of the AMZI.
On top of this, intensity modulation is vitally important to implement QKD with decoy
states. Here, multiple photon numbers are transmitted by Alice. This chapter will focus
strongly on how these decoy states can be implemented.
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Fig. 5.2 Intensity and phase receiver. The polar (Z) basis is measured with direct detection
and the equatorial (X/Y) bases are measured using an AMZI with a phase modulator (PM)
on one arm. This phase modulator is only necessary in some implementations. An attenuator
(Att) is placed on the polar basis detection arm.
5.3 Theory
5.3.1 Decoy states
As described in Section 1.3.3, the secure key rate of discrete variable protocols ordinarily
scales very poorly with distance when weak coherent pulses are used instead of ideal single
photons [57]. Fortunately, a method known as decoy-state QKD allows weak coherent pulse
based QKD to have the same scaling as QKD with ideal single photons [87, 165, 166, 167,
168, 169]. In decoy-state QKD, pulses with a number of different mean photon numbers are
prepared by Alice, rather than the previous case of a single mean photon number, µ . This
allows the two users to place a tight bound on how many detector events are caused by single
photons and are thus can be used to generate a secure key. Previously they had to assume
that every multi-photon pulse emitted by Alice causes a click in Bob’s detectors, meaning
they severely underestimate the number of single photon events. This method improves the
scaling of the QKD secure key rate with transmittance, η , from O(η2) to O(η).
Whilst this improvement comes at the cost of requiring an additional intensity modulator
inside Alice’s transmitter, the price is often seen as small compared to the benefits. For
this reason, the majority of current BB84 implementations use decoy pulses, including in
quantum networks [170, 171, 172, 173, 174]. The advancement has allowed practical QKD
systems to reach distances beyond 400 km and to achieve secure key rates over 13 megabits
per second [99, 100].
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Ideally, Alice would prepare signal states with a certain intensity, an infinite number of
decoy state intensities (lower than the signal state intensity), and a vacuum state (a state with
no photons) [166, 167]. Whilst this gives the highest asymptotic secure key rate, this situation
is completely impractical. Not only would it be impossible to experimentally implement, it
would also require a large amount of post-processing for reconciliation. A good trade-off
is where Alice prepares three different photon intensities [80]. These are a signal state, s,
a decoy state, v, and a vacuum state w, satisfying v ≥ w ≥ 0 and s > v+w. This can be
implemented using an intensity modulator in Alice.
The decoy-state technique gives Alice and Bob more information that can be used to
estimate the single photon yield, Y1 used in their secure key rate calculation. Yn is defined
as the probability of Bob registering a detection event, given that Alice has prepared an
n-photon state. The gain, Qµ , is the probability of Bob registering a detection event, given









Gain can be measured directly from experiments, because it is the number of received counts
divided by the number of times an intensity state was prepared.
Decoy-state QKD with three decoy states gives three gain equations that can be used to
bound Y1. These can be solved numerically using linear programming, however analytical
bounds are often used in practice. Similarly to how finite-key-size effects are approached,
the worst case bounds are identified, which is the case with the lowest possible single photon
yield, Y L1 . Whilst the derivation has been shown in other works [80], it does provide some
extra clarity on the improvements of using decoy states, hence a basic derivation is shown
here.
First, a lower bound for the zero photon yield is identified, Y L0 :






















Y2 + . . . , (5.3)
≤ (v−w)Y0. (5.4)
giving



























































= Qµeµ −Y0 −µY1. (5.10)
Substituting this back into Eq. 5.9 and using Eq. 5.5 gives
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
s





(Qses −Y L0 )
)
, (5.11)
providing an equation with only experimentally measured quantities.
One assumption in decoy-state protocols is that the decoy and signal states are indistin-
guishable, meaning they must have identical spectral and temporal properties. Any deviation
from this will give Eve some information about the intensity state, allowing her to perform
an optimal attack that would require a modified security proof [175, 176].
5.3.2 Secure key rates
Experimentally, the received counts when Alice has prepared an intensity state µ in basis A,
given that Bob has measured in basis B, CµAB, are measured and recorded. The QBER is
calculated from the visibility in each basis and the error counts, ECµAB, are calculated by
multiplying the QBER by the number of counts. These quantities are scaled to account for
the finite-key-size effects, giving a ‘worst case scenario’ secure key rate. This also allows us
to quantify the security of our system using εsec, defined as the probability the key is insecure.
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The higher the security, the larger these fluctuations become, reducing the secure key rate
compared to the asymptotic case. The bounds on the gain can then be calculated by dividing
by the number of times Bob prepared each state.
For this implementation of decoy-state polar BB84 with finite-key-size effects, the
security analysis outlined by Lim et al [87] is used. These equations are applied to the data
gathered in the Z and X bases. The yields are bounded using a different method to that
outlined in the previous section, however the main principle is the same. Here, the lower
bound on the secure key rate that can be obtained is
RL = [YZZ;0 +YZZ;1(1− IE)−λErrC −∆]/t, (5.13)
where t is the time used to collect the block for processing, YXX ,ZZ;n is the number of counts
measured by Bob in the X or Z basis, given that Alice prepared an n-photon state in the X or
Z basis respectively, IE is Eve’s information, λErrC is the error correction leakage and ∆ is
the finite-key-size correction term.
The zero and single photon yields in the Z basis are of particular interest because these













































τn in these equations is the probability of Alice preparing an n-photon state, which can be







These n-photon quantities can also be calculated in the X basis by substituting the measured
counts in Z for those in X.
IE in Eq. 5.13 is the maximum amount of information that Eve is able to obtain about the
key, given the measured counts and error rates. It can be calculated for BB84 by applying the
binary entropy function, h(x), to the phase error rate in z, φZ:


























The leakage due to error correction, λErrC is calculated in the Z basis using the total
number of bits measured, CZ , the efficiency of the error correction process, fErrC, set to 1.15
in this implementation, and the combined QBER of all intensity states, QZ:
λErrC =CZ fErrCh(QZ). (5.22)








These epsilon terms define our certainty on the security and correctness of the key, εsec and
εcor, respectively.
An extension of the BB84 protocol exists where the X, Y and Z states are used, known as












where EX ,Y,Z is the QBER in the X,Y and Z basis respectively. This gives a slightly higher
tolerance to the error than traditional BB84, allowing keys to be distilled over a longer
channel attenuation.
Whilst six-state QKD has a better performance, phase-encoded BB84 is far more common
than six-state QKD or polar BB84. This is because phase-encoded BB84 is the simplest to
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experimentally implement. The AMZI implementation of phase-encoded BB84 is elegant be-
cause phase randomised pulses can simply be sent through the Mach-Zehnder interferometer
to create the signal and reference pulse. Adding time-bin encoding into this situation would
require an extra intensity modulator, further complicating the system.
5.4 Implementation
5.4.1 Directly-modulated decoy states
The first method of decoy-state production with the directly-modulated transmitter is to set
three different driving current levels for the pulse preparation laser, depending on the desired
pulse intensity. The signal pulse is produced by driving the slave laser far above its threshold
and the decoy pulse by driving it above its threshold, but slightly lower than the signal pulse.
The vacuum state can then be given by driving the laser below its threshold. This idea is
shown in Fig. 5.3. As in Chapter 4, the presence of some electrical signal during the vacuum
pulses is very important to reduce patterning effects. The voltage ratio between the applied
electrical signals are 1 : 0.8 : 0.6 for signal:decoy:vacuum states.
This method of directly producing the decoy states is the most desirable option because it
does not add extra components that would add to the complexity of the system. This allows
the system to be more compact, lending itself more readily to on-chip devices, and also
makes the transmitter less expensive. A final reason to remove the intensity modulator is that
it removes any potential Trojan horse attack on this device. In this attack, Eve sends a bright
pulse of light into Alice and measures the back reflections. The signal reflected from the
active intensity modulator could contain information about the transmitted intensity state.
One countermeasure is to simply have cascaded isolators at Alice’s output so that Eve would
have to shine in such a large amount of light that she would damage the optical fibre and turn
her attack into a denial of service.
The main drawback in this method of producing decoy states is that their intensity is seen
to depend on the previous pulse sequence. This is due to transient laser oscillations of one
pulse overlapping with that of the subsequent pulse. The variation in decoy state intensities
is also seen when using an intensity modulator, because the intensity modulator response to
voltage is sinusoidal. The signal and vacuum states are produced by operating at the peak
and trough, whereas the decoy state is between the two, giving a greater output uncertainty
to imprecise voltages. Interesting theoretical research has been done into post-processing
to remove any pulses that could leak information due to these patterning effects [178]. The
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Fig. 5.3 Directly-modulated decoy-state schematic. Six-state QKD with a lower driving
level to directly produce decoy states.
effect has been mitigated here by shaping the slave laser pulses with ‘shelves’, shown in
Fig. 5.4. The result can be seen in Fig. 5.5. Whilst the results are not ideal, this method does
indeed help to ensure that the pulses are all stimulated from a similar carrier and photon
density level.
Fig. 5.4 Slave signal ‘shelves’. The pulses are shaped to minimise the effect of transient
oscillations from the previous pulse.
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Fig. 5.5 Directly-modulated decoy-state fluctuations without compensation. Intensity
fluctuations of all pulses in a 4096-bit six-state QKD pattern when the decoy states are
produced using direct modulation. The signal state has a value of 0.233±0.004, whereas
the decoy state has a value of 0.0955±0.014. There are fewer decoy measurements than
signal measurements due to the increased probability of Alice sending a signal state.
Another side channel to address with this implementation is that of a change in wavelength
of the decoy states. The lower driving current means that the spectrum changes, meaning
Eve could identify the intensity state using a wavelength measurement without introducing
any errors. Whilst this is indeed true for the directly-modulated system, the effect can be
mitigated by using a narrow linewidth (12 GHz) filter at Alice’s output, as shown in Fig. 5.6.
It is relatively easy to find similar spectral regions for such a narrow bandwidth, thus the
output spectra overlap well. Loss due to the filter is not an issue because Alice has to further
attenuate the signal to the single photon level.
A more pressing side channel is the timing of the signal and decoy states. The laser
turn-on time is dependent on the amplitude of the applied current. A larger current will create
population inversion more quickly, leading to a shorter turn-on time. What this ultimately
means is that the directly-produced decoy states will occur at a slightly later time than the
signal states, an effect that can be observed in Fig. 5.7. Interestingly, this figure also shows
that the temporal profiles of the pulses are identical, thus there is no side channel if they can
be made to overlap.
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Fig. 5.6 Directly-modulated decoy states spectra. Experimental results using a fixed
12 GHz spectral filter at 1550.08 nm. Both filtered and unfiltered spectra are normalised to
have the same area.
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Fig. 5.7 Directly-modulated decoy states time offset. Traces of the signal pulse and the
decoy pulse. The decoy pulse is offset by 500 ps.
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The obvious solution to mitigate this effect is to simply shift the electrical decoy signals
so the optical pulses occur at the same time as one another. The AWG being used has a
sample rate of 24 GSamples/s, meaning the electrical pulses can only be shifted by multiples
of 42 ps. In order to apply arbitrary time shifts, one AWG channel is used for the signal
states and another is used for the decoy states. With careful delay alignment, these signals
can be combined using a high-speed electrical combiner and input to the laser.
This solution worked well to produce a temporal overlap between signal and decoy
states. Unfortunately, however, this led to a large increase in the aforementioned patterning
effect, shown in Fig. 5.8. This is because the transient oscillations from the previous laser
pulse become more influential as the pulse is moved closer to the previous pulse. Using
the previous solution of adding ‘shelves’ to the pulses was not as effective here, leaving an
unacceptably high variation in decoy state intensities.
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Fig. 5.8 Directly-modulated decoy state fluctuations with compensation. Intensity fluc-
tuations when the decoy pulse overlaps perfectly with the signal pulse. The signal state has a
value of 0.223±0.012, whereas the decoy state has a value of 0.09428±0.029
5.4.2 Externally-modulated decoy states
The most common intensity modulators for QKD systems are LiNbO3-based Mach-Zehnder
interferometers with a phase delay induced in one arm by electrical modulation, as shown in
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Fig. 5.9. These are known as Mach-Zehnder modulators (MZMs) and are used to produce the
signal (‘s’), decoy (‘v’) and vacuum (‘w’) states in decoy-state QKD. Here, the input light
field is equally split into two different paths, one of which undergoes a phase shift before
they are recombined. The value of the phase difference defines the intensity of the output,
meaning the transmission can be controlled by applying electrical modulations to the phase
modulation arm. The light travels in separate paths, thus each can undergo different phase
shifts due to ambient conditions. This creates a drift in the output intensity that has to be
removed using feedback to vary the DC voltage. MZMs can work up to very high bit rates by
using a travelling-wave phase modulator, where a short electrical pulse travels through the
device at the same speed as the light pulse [62]. Due to the birefringent nature of the LiNbO3
phase modulator crystals, input light must be linearly polarised along one crystal axis.
Fig. 5.9 Mach-Zehnder modulator. Schematic of a Mach Zehnder modulator with a
coupling ratio R:T and a travelling wave phase modulator.
The patterning effect in these intensity modulators comes from their DC dependence
and the sinusoidal response to voltage, as shown in Fig. 5.10 (black line). Small voltage
fluctuations, shown as ∆V in the figure, cause an insignificant variation in the output power,
∆P, for ‘s’ and ‘w’ states. The ‘v’ state is produced away from these points, however, where
small voltage fluctuations can create significant changes in the output power. At high clock
rates, the electrical signal does not have enough recovery time to reach the same base level
before the next pulse, effectively changing the DC level. Also, the mean DC value of the input
electrical pattern will vary slightly depending on the random pattern in that section, unless
sophisticated encoding schemes are used. These effects both create voltage fluctuations in a
random modulation pattern.
Current commercial intensity modulators are designed to achieve the maximum possible
optical extinction ratio (ER). However, this is not ideal when ‘v’ states with an attenuation of
around 6 dB are desired, because the voltage fluctuations will cause large deviations in the
power that are dependent on the previous level. To get around this patterning effect, it would
be better to operate the intensity modulator at two levels, with the device designed such that









Fig. 5.10 IM Response. Transmission (T) with voltage (V) for an interferometer-based
intensity modulator. Power deviations for identical voltage shifts (∆V ) at the peak (∆P2) and
quadrature point (∆P1) are given. The red dotted line shows the output of a low extinction
ratio interferometer.
the ER can be chosen arbitrarily, as shown by the red dotted line in Fig. 1b. This means that
regardless of the intensity required, it would be possible to operate the device at its half-wave
voltage and faithfully produce the desired intensity levels. This technique works because the
intensity of the light output from one arm of interferometer-based intensity modulators is
I ∝ R2 +T 2 +2RT cos(∆φ) (5.25)
where R : T is the coupling ratio of the interfering beam splitter(s), R+ T = 1 and ∆φ
is the difference in phase between the two pulses when they recombine. This allows the
ER, expressed in dB, to be calculated using −10log10 (Imin/Imax), where Imin and Imax are
obtained from Eq. 5.25 by setting ∆φ to 0 or π , respectively. The result as a function of R is
ERmax =−20log10(|2R−1|). (5.26)
The ER can be chosen to suit the desired application by using a fixed beamsplitter, or it can
be tuned with a variable beamsplitter. The aforementioned commercial intensity modulators
are designed to target an infinite extinction ratio, which is obtained for R = 0.5. In reality,
however, the splitting ratio is never exactly 0.5 and realistic values are between 20 and 30 dB.
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Intensity modulators based on Sagnac interferometers work on a similar principle to
MZMs, as shown in Fig. 5.11 [179]. The light is again split into two separate paths, denoted
as ‘parallel’ and ‘anti-parallel’, in relation to the propagation direction of the modulating
electrical travelling wave. A travelling-wave phase modulator applies a phase shift to the
‘parallel’ wave, meaning the intensity of output light can be controlled. The major difference
from an MZM is that the two light pulses travel through the same length of fibre in a short
period of time. This means that any perturbations to the fiber, or changes to the DC of the
phase modulator, affect both pulses equally. This inherent feature of the modulator means
that the device can be very stable and does not require feedback routines [180].
Fig. 5.11 Sagnac IM. Schematic of the Sagnac-based intensity modulator with a coupling
ratio R:T.
To demonstrate their operation, 61.5 ps light pulses from the optically injection locked
2 GHz gain switched laser diode described in previous chapters are input to the Sagnac
intensity modulator shown in Fig. 5.11. The modulator attenuates or blocks light with no
electrical input, so 125 ps electrical pulses are input to the phase modulator when a signal
pulse is desired. The electrical pulse delay is tuned so the electrical and light pulses align. A
210-bit pseudorandom pattern is generated and the corresponding electrical pattern is applied
to the phase modulator. Short subsets of the resulting outputs are shown in Fig. 5.12 for
beamsplitters with different coupling ratios. Three beamsplitters are tested, with nominal
splitting ratios of 50:50, 75:25 and 80:20, but realistically providing ERs of 30.48 dB, 5.83 dB
and 3.94 dB respectively at their half-wave voltage.
An analysis of the patterning effects for the Sagnac interferometers with a 210-bit pseudo-
random pattern is shown in Table 5.1. Whilst the modulator can be used to produce vacuum
states, the lower optical power pulses are referred to as decoy pulses for all coupling ratios.
98 Concurrent phase and intensity modulated QKD






T i m e  ( n s )












 8 0 : 2 0
Fig. 5.12 Oscilloscope traces. The traces at the maximum ERs are shown for a random
input pattern for three different beamsplitters.
The transitions to ‘v’ states are not shown for the 50:50 beamsplitter because the photodiode
cannot accurately measure such a high ER. The patterning effects are negligible for all pulse
combinations in all three intensity modulators. This is especially obvious when compared to
the best case scenario of -18.2% deviation observed by Yoshino et al. [178] when producing
decoy states using a commercial MZM at the quadrature point. The improvement with
5.4 Implementation 99
the Sagnac comes from working only at two levels, as shown in Fig. 5.10, but also on the
independence of the modulator on electrical DC drifts.
Table 5.1 External patterning effects. The pulse intensities extracted from a 210-bit pseu-
dorandom pattern input to Sagnac intensity modulators with three different beamsplitting
ratios when preceded by a decoy pulse (‘v’) or another signal pulse (‘s’). The average ‘s’
pulse intensity is normalised to unity for each beamsplitter.














The difference in stability between a Sagnac intensity modulator with an 80:20 beamsplit-
ter and a commercial MZM is shown in Fig. 5.13. A power meter with a 1 s averaging time
is used to measure the output power for modulators with no applied AC. The Sagnac output
shows a Gaussian variation about the mean, with a 1.4 % standard deviation. The DC of the
MZM is tuned to provide a similar ER to the Sagnac intensity modulator, left for a day to
thermally stabilize, and then is left with no feedback. The output power of the MZM varies
unpredictably over a large range of values due to drift, giving a 61.2 % standard deviation.
The finite variation of the Sagnac modulator is explained by a misalignment of the phase
modulator crystal axis causing mixing between orthogonal polarizations. This is confirmed
experimentally by a small observed dependence of the Sagnac output power on the applied
DC. The variation could be reduced further by manufacturing a phase modulator with no
misalignment.
With regard to modulator design, the ideal case is where the phase modulator is placed
asymmetrically in the Sagnac loop. When placed in the center, the ‘parallel’ light pulse has
an interaction length of the whole phase modulator because of the co-propagating electrical
pulse, whereas the ‘anti-parallel’ light is also modulated by the counter-propagating electrical
pulse, albeit with a much smaller interaction length. A carefully designed offset from
the centre ensures the ‘anti-parallel’ light does not interact with the electrical pulse. At
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Fig. 5.13 Temporal stability. The output power from an unmodulated Mach Zehnder
intensity modulator and the 80:20 Sagnac intensity modulator with no feedback. The power
is normalised so the maximum power output is unity.
higher clock rates this interaction is unavoidable, regardless of the system design, leading
to a slightly higher half-wave voltage for the Sagnac intensity modulator than that of the
phase modulator. If the input clock rate is too high, however, patterning effects will start to
emerge because multiple ‘anti-parallel’ light pulses will be modulated by a single counter-
propagating electrical pulse. This limits the maximum clock rate to 3 GHz for ordinary bulk
phase modulators with a crystal length of 5 cm, however can be much higher if smaller phase
modulators are used [181].
With regard to how this device could be implemented in a QKD system, two decoy-
state QKD would require two Sagnac intensity modulators to remove the patterning effects.
Fortunately, the modulator stability would mean that this does not add too much complexity
to the system. Even still, using as few components as possible would be ideal. One way this
could be done is with a single decoy-state QKD protocol, which would require just a single
intensity modulator [80, 182]. In fact, the Sagnac intensity modulator is ideal to produce the
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decoy states with the directly-modulated quantum transmitter. This transmitter could produce
the signal and vacuum states, requiring just a single intensity modulator for the decoy states.
5.4.3 Concurrent phase and intensity modulation
Bringing the previously demonstrated direct phase and intensity modulation together to
provide concurrent modulation is simple. The phase preparation laser is modulated in the
same way as for the phase-encoded BB84 implementation. The laser is driven above threshold
to encode a phase shift between two slave laser pulses, before being driven below threshold
for a short period of time to randomise the next pulse pair. The pulse preparation laser is
patterned in the same way as the COW implementation. The electrical signal into both lasers
must then be carefully aligned so the different encoding methods overlap at the correct time.
The transmission probabilities for each basis are set to PZ = 0.8 and PX = PY = 0.1 and
the pulse intensities probabilities are set to Ps = 0.8 and Pv = Pw = 0.1. All three bases are
measured separately, allowing the results to be separated and normalised in post-processing
for a comparison between phase-encoded and polar BB84. The actual pulse intensities are
s = 0.5 photons per pulse, v = 0.038 photons per pulse and w = 0.001 photons per pulse.
Data is measured for 20 minutes in each basis, giving 40 minutes of acquisition for each
two-basis protocol. These quantities allow a large number of single photons to be used for
the key, whilst obtaining a large sample size for the minority bases and intensities to keep
statistical fluctuations low. A 210-bit pseudorandom pattern is generated to act as the key and
the corresponding electrical signal is input to the laser diodes.
In this implementation, the intensity modulator is used solely to produce the decoy
states. This minimises the patterning effects because just two levels are modulated. This
means that an additional intensity modulator would be required to equalise the mean photon
number in the Z basis and X and Y bases. The demonstration is proof of principle, however,
meaning this attenuation can simply be moved to the receiver, where a fixed 3 dB attenuation
should be added to the X and Y basis receiver. In fact, due to the requirement of basis-
independent detection probabilities, 4.7 dB of attenuation is required in the Z-basis, so 1.7 dB
of attenuation is experimentally added to the Z basis.
5.5 Results and discussion
After tuning the system parameters to minimise the error rate, the optical pulses are sent
through a variable optical attenuator to attenuate the pulses to the desired mean photon
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number. The pulses are then sent through another variable optical attenuator acting as the
quantum channel, or through real optical fibre. A 211-bin histogram is collected for each
distance, allowing the gains and error rate for each basis and intensity to be extracted.
Figure 5.14 shows a 10 ns example from all three measurement bases without any external
intensity modulation. Measurement in the Z basis shows the high ER intensity modulation
and also shows that there is no difference in intensity between a full pulse followed by a
vacuum pulse compared to a full pulse followed by another full pulse. The X and Y basis
show a number of different pulse intensities. The maximum and minimum intensity pulses
arise when a bit is encoded in that basis. The half-intensity pulses arise either when a bit
is encoded in the other phase basis, or due to the random interference between pulses in
different blocks. The quarter-intensity pulses are when there is an empty-full pulse sequence
in the Z basis.
The worst-case fluctuations of gain and QBER are then calculated using Eq. 5.12. The
counts are shown in Fig. 5.15 (top). As expected, they decrease exponentially with channel
loss because the photon number and acquisition time is kept constant. The error rates are
shown in Fig. 5.15 (bottom). The 2.6 percentage point reduction in error rate of the Z basis
compared to the X and Y will allow fewer bits to be used in the error correction process,
increasing the secure key rate.
The security parameters εsec and εcor are set to 2×10−11 and 1×10−15 respectively. The
lower bound on secure key rate can be found using Eq. 5.13. The key rates for polar BB84
are shown in Fig. 5.16. Here, a 1.26 Mbit/s secure key rate can be distilled at 40 km using an
attenuator, and 246 kbit/s in real fibre of length 75 km. A positive secure key rate could be
achieved up to 250 km in the asymptotic limit. The finite-key-size analysis reduces the secure
key rate to zero at around 35 dB with 40 minutes of key time. At 38 dB channel attenuation,
just over 1000 counts are observed for the decoy states in the minority basis, which gives
too much statistical variation in the counts and error rate. This could be extended simply by
obtaining a larger block size.
To compare between polar and phase-encoded BB84, the secure key rate is calculated in
the asymptotic limit using the experimental parameters obtained in the ZX and YX bases
respectively. The counts are renormalised according to the transmission basis probabilities
to allow for a fair comparison. The key rate is improved by 1.60 times when using the ZX
basis compared to the YX basis. Also, phase-encoded BB84 is able to reach an attenuation
of 48.5 dB with a positive secure key rate, whereas polar BB84 can reach slightly further, at
50.1 dB.
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Fig. 5.14 Six directly-modulated states traces. Measurement traces without decoy state
preparation and basis intensity equalisation. The Z basis (top) has only a single trace,
whereas the X and Y bases (middle and bottom) each have two AMZI outputs. The cor-
responding input pattern values are displayed at the top, labelled as Bb, where B is the
basis and b is the logical bit value inside that basis. A red (grey) peak in the X and Y bases
correspond to a ‘0’ (‘1’) logical bit, where the photon exits through the upper (lower) AMZI
port. Peaks in output 1 (2) of the AMZI are complemented by small counts in output 2 (1)
(middle inset), showing the high distinguishability between bits.
Although these results show polar BB84 outperforming phase-encoded BB84, it is not
necessarily better to implement polar BB84. There is indeed the benefit of being able to use
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Fig. 5.15 Experimental counts and error rates. The raw counts for each matched basis
and intensity for the 20 minutes acquisition time (top) and the corresponding measured
QBER (bottom). Lines give the simulation results, stars give the experimental results in real
fibre and all other symbols give the experimental results with an attenuator as the optical
channel.
just three SPDs in a passive receiver for polar BB84, compared to four in phase-encoded
BB84. In an active implementation, however, phase-encoded BB84 could be carried out
using just two SPDs, with a phase modulator in Bob’s interferometer. The improvement the
directly-modulated transmitter has over a standard transmitter for polar BB84 is marginal. If
a different intensity modulator is required for each intensity level, the directly-modulated
transmitter would require two intensity modulators, whereas the standard transmitter would
require three. This is because the vacuum level can be modulated directly in the former
transmitter. Although the intensity encoding used in polar BB84 provides a higher secure
key rate, the phase-encoded BB84 protocol could be implemented with a single intensity
modulator for the directly-modulated transmitter.
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Fig. 5.16 Polar BB84 Results. Secure key rate (SKR) in the asymptotic (filled symbols,
dotted line) and finite-key-size regimes (empty symbols, solid line). The star corresponds to
data collected with real fibre as the quantum channel.
One potential improvement would be the theoretical development of a protocol based on
polar BB84. This protocol would have signal states transmitted solely in the X or Y bases,
with decoy states transmitted solely in the Z basis. The transmitter inherently emits the Z
basis with one half the intensity of the X and Y bases, thus this protocol could retain the
benefits of decoy-state QKD, whilst requiring no external modulators.
As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, six-state QKD is also a potential protocol that could
be implemented. Unfortunately, however, the increase in secure key rate is very small,
especially considering the extra complexity of the receiver. Also, the impact of finite-key-size
fluctuations was shown to be the limiting factor in polar BB84, which will only be worse if
more time is used to transmit and receive two extra states.
The transmitter also shows promise to be useful in classical communications. The
patterning effects that proved prohibitive for QKD when directly producing multiple intensity
states are not a major concern here, it will just add a slight degradation to the distinguishability
between states. Different intensities can be produced directly, and also a vacuum state can be
produced, increasing the amount of information encoded per symbol. The direct modulation
means that the system is not reliant on multiple external modulators, making it cheaper, less
complex and also easier to integrate with other components. The optical injection locking
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also ensures that all pulses have the same wavelength. This removes a side channel for QKD,
but also means the system has low chirp, reducing the intersymbol interference caused by
dispersion effects. This thesis has shown the accurate production of four phase states because
that is all that is required for QKD protocols, however more phase states can be encoded by
using more phase-preparation levels.
5.6 Summary
This chapter has explored the potential of concurrent phase and intensity modulation with
the directly-modulated quantum transmitter. Firstly, decoy states were discussed. Here,
three different intensity states are transmitted by Alice, allowing QKD secure key rates to
overcome the poor scaling with distance. These would ordinarily be produced using an
intensity modulator, so direct modulation of these states would simplify the QKD transmitter.
Whilst it was possible to create states with similar spectra, unfortunately the decoy states had
intensity fluctuations over 10 %, and also the decoy states are offset from the signal states by
30 ps. This enables Eve to perform a sophisticated attack that removes the benefit of using
the decoy states.
Next, decoy state preparation using an external IM was described. Whilst QKD appli-
cations usually use MZM-based IMs, they have the drawback of being unstable and can
have large patterning effects. For this reason, a two-level Sagnac interferometer is built and
tested. This interferometer shows no patterning effects when operated at the maximum and
minimum transmission and the ER can be varied by choosing the correct coupler for the
interferometer. This modulator also has the advantage of being inherently stable because it
utilises a common-path interferometer.
Finally, polar-BB84 was introduced. This is identical to phase-encoded BB84, except
it uses the Z-basis with either the X or Y basis. Implementation of this requires concurrent
intensity and phase modulation, alongside phase randomisation. The techniques used in
the previous chapters are combined to enable this with the directly-modulated quantum
transmitter, then data is obtained for 20 minutes in each measurement basis. The Z basis
error rate of 0.2 %, compared to the X and Y bases error rates of 2.8 %, means that fewer bits
are lost to error correction in polar BB84 than phase-encoded BB84. An asymptotic analysis
shows that the secure key rate of polar BB84 is 1.60 times higher than in phase-encoded
BB84. A finite-key-size analysis is also carried out for the polar BB84 protocol. This shows
secure key rates up to 35 dB channel attenuation, with megabit per second rates below 8 dB
channel attenuation. It was also shown that the directly modulated transmitter shows no
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patterning effects, meaning that the same intensity pulse can be produced regardless of the




The ability of the directly-modulated transmitter to adapt to a number of different QKD
protocols has been demonstrated in this thesis. Further experiments and research should help
to demonstrate its real world practicality.
Side channel attacks have been described throughout this thesis. It would be valuable
to perform a full analysis of the system and identify any weaknesses. One example of an
attack on the BB84 protocol implementation would be to inject a large amount of light from
the quantum channel into the system. This could have the effect of raising the master laser
above threshold during the phase randomisation modulation, essentially ensuring that there
is no phase randomisation between different blocks. As described in the thesis, this has the
potential to dramatically reduce the secure key rate. A simple countermeasure to this attack is
to cascade optical isolators, however an analysis of how the attack affects the system would
show whether this countermeasure is necessary.
It is time-consuming to perform different experimental analyses on the system. It would
therefore be very useful if an accurate simulation could be built, making searches over large
parameter spaces feasible. As an example, it would be interesting to identify the maximum
clock rate that the system can work at. In practice this would require a new interferometer,
which could be expensive and take a long time to deliver or build. The simulation would
allow this to be determined rapidly, accounting for the finite modulation bandwidth of system
components.
There is also the potential for a new decoy-state protocol that is particularly adapted to
this transmitter. The work in Chapter 5 showed that polar BB84 would require two external
intensity modulators in order to stop patterning effects. This is because the X or Y-basis
states have to be attenuated by 3 dB so they contain the same number of photons as the
Z-basis states. One way to get around this would be to develop a QKD protocol that uses the
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X or Y-basis as signal states and the Z-basis as the decoy states. If this protocol were to be
developed, it would be trivial to demonstrate experimental modulator-free decoy-state QKD.
New protocols based on weak coherent pulses are still being proposed. One example, the
differential phase-time QKD protocol [183] has the potential to offer higher secure key rates
compared to other distributed phase reference protocols, because two bits of information
are encoded per detection event. The transmitter is able to fulfil all the requirements of this
protocol, so it would be interesting to compare how it performs experimentally against the
other established QKD protocols. The same could be done for other QKD protocols based
on weak coherent pulses as they are published.
Receivers can often be expensive and complex, so it is likely that a user will have a
system that can only work with certain QKD protocols. It is also likely, depending on the
detectors used, that the receiver clock rate will vary between users. There is nothing stopping
the directly-modulated transmitter working at different clock rates because the electrical
signal into the lasers can be changed arbitrarily. The effect of a different clock rate on the
QBER would be interesting to explore.
Further to this, it would also be desirable for the transmitter to rapidly switch between
different QKD protocols. This would allow for a quantum network where keys could be
distributed to different users as they are required with little downtime. This experiment would
require field-programmable gate arrays to provide the modulations to the lasers and also
feedback to the lasers to ensure the setup is optimal. This is necessary because the voltage
applied to the lasers can change depending on the protocol, for example the DC voltage is
lower for the BB84 protocol to enable phase randomisation, which changes the temperature
of the laser, meaning the locking needs to be re-calibrated.
These two developments would pave the way for implementation of the transmitter in
a real quantum network. This could be implemented using the ‘metro’ network link in
Cambridge between the Electrical Engineering Division in West Cambridge, the Department
of Engineering in the city centre and Toshiba Research Europe Limited in the Cambridge
Science Park. This work would validate the claim that the transmitter could become the
future transmitter in quantum networks.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
QKD is a practical technology that allows two users to securely exchange a key using
weak laser pulses. According to quantum mechanics, a measurement on the single photon
component of these pulses will disturb the photon. This means that if Alice is sending
weak laser pulses to Bob, they can determine if an eavesdropper is present because she will
introduce errors when she performs a measurement.
The field is currently at the stage where many laboratory and real-world implementations
have been demonstrated. QKD has been shown over real optical fibre networks with a
high rate, and over a distance of 1200 km using satellites. The technology is reaching the
point where researchers and companies have to think about how the technology could be
implemented in practical real-world quantum networks.
Differential phase encoding is a popular technique for QKD because it is tolerant to
dephasing and polarisation drift in optical fibres. This can be implemented using an external
phase modulator to control the phase of light pulses. Instead of this, phase modulation is
performed directly in this thesis. One laser is directly modulated to change its phase evolution
(the phase preparation laser), before being injected into a pulsed laser (the pulse preparation
laser). These pulses then adopt the phase of the first laser. A half-wave voltage of 0.35 V has
been demonstrated, the first demonstration of a sub-volt phase modulator, and an order of
magnitude lower than commercial phase modulators, which have half-wave voltages around
4-6 V. Whilst the direct method is more power efficient, one benefit of using a commercial
phase modulator is that higher clock rates can be reached. The directly-modulated transmitter
is limited by the optical bandwidth of the master laser, which is around 10 GHz, whereas
commercial phase modulators can reach clock rates of 40 GHz. The complexity of the
systems is comparable: direct modulation requires two lasers connected by a circulator,
whereas external modulation requires a laser and a phase modulator.
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Phase randomisation is also required in some QKD protocols, for example BB84 and
DQPS. There are currently two ways of realising this in QKD systems. The first can be
used in BB84, and splits phase randomised pulses into an early and late time bin, encoding
a differential phase between the two. The difficulty with this solution is maintaining the
delay length of the interferometer used to split the pulses, a problem that requires complex
feedback mechanisms. The second method is to use a phase modulator and a random number
generator. This is more complicated than the first solution, however, requiring infinitely
precise electrical modulation signals and a high-speed random number generator. In this
thesis, global phase randomisation is made possible at 2 GHz by driving the phase preparation
laser below threshold for 125 ps.
The decoy-state technique is a method that has allowed QKD with weak coherent pulses to
have the same scaling with channel loss as QKD with single photon sources. This is because
an accurate bound can be placed on the number of single photons measured by Bob. Without
the decoy-state technique, Alice and Bob would have to assume that all of Bob’s clicks could
have originated from a multi-photon preparation in Alice. In ordinary QKD systems, the
decoy-state technique requires an external intensity modulator to selectively attenuate pulses
to different mean photon numbers. Recent work has shown that the most common intensity
modulator used, a Mach-Zehnder modulator, can introduce ‘patterning effects’. This is where
the pulse intensities are correlated, revealing extra information to an eavesdropper. Also,
these modulators are temporally unstable and prone to DC drift. In order to remove this side
channel and instability, a two-level intensity modulator based on a Sagnac interferometer is
proposed. Working at the half-wave voltage of the modulator and changing the beamsplitting
ratio ensures that the patterning effects are minimal. Also, the common path interferometer
guarantees stability and independence to DC drift. Unfortunately, because only two levels
are modulated, two intensity modulators would ordinarily be required for decoy-state QKD
with a traditional transmitter. This disadvantage is not true for phase-encoded BB84 with the
directly-modulated transmitter, because the vacuum states can be directly modulated. This
would then require just a single intensity modulator to provide the decoy states.
The ability to perform phase and intensity modulation allows a fair comparison of multiple
QKD protocols from a single transmitter. This is shown in Fig. 7.1. The DPS protocol has
the best performance, with almost a 3 dB improvement over the COW and polar decoy-state
BB84 protocols. This is mainly due to the DPS protocol having double the effective clock
rate because every time bin is useful. Also, there is only a single measurement basis so there
is no sifting loss because Alice and Bob never have mismatched bases. Finally, the DPS
protocol does not require decoy states like the other two, meaning the single photon yield
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for the key is higher. The COW protocol is unable to reach the same distances as the DPS
and polar decoy-state BB84 protocols. This is because only 10 % of the pulses received
by Bob are used to measure the visibility, meaning dark counts are much more of an issue.
This could be improved by changing the beamsplitting ratio, however it would decrease the
secure key rate at short distances. It is also important to note that the polar decoy-state BB84
protocol is the only one of the three with security against coherent attacks. The DQPS and
phase-encoded BB84 protocols have a worse scaling with channel transmittance because the
mean photon number must be decreased as the channel length increases. This leads to their
secure key rates being worse at all distances, and also they can only reach half the distance
of the DPS and polar decoy-state protocols.
Fig. 7.1 All protocols key rates. Asymptotic secure key rates for all QKD protocols imple-
mented in this thesis.
This transmitter has great potential to be used in a quantum communication network.
Although the comparison figure shows some protocols outperforming others, this does not
account for differences in the receiver complexity, or the security level of the protocols. These
factors will cause users to implement different protocols depending on their requirements.
Having a simple transmitter that can adapt to the receiver is therefore a highly desirable
property, allowing users to communicate indiscriminately with all receivers.
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